At midnight, a new 10-day ceasefire agreement in Lebanon came into effect, and at first glance, it looks like a chance to at least temporarily halt the dangerous escalation on Israel’s northern border. However, if you read not only the headlines but also the construction of the agreements themselves, it becomes clear: this is not about a real settlement, but rather a short pause during which the parties and mediators will try to understand whether there is any basis for a more sustainable agreement.
For the Israeli audience, the main question now sounds simple: has it really become safer in the north? And the honest answer is still cautious. Israel agreed to the ceasefire but did not renounce the right to self-defense, did not withdraw forces from southern Lebanon, and did not receive a clear answer to the main practical question — who exactly and how will restrain Hezbollah if the Lebanese state still does not fully control the situation.
What the new agreement establishes
The ceasefire agreement is designed for an initial period of ten days. At the same time, it is immediately stipulated that it can be extended if negotiations show real progress and if Lebanon demonstrates the ability to exercise its sovereignty. This wording seems key because it shifts the entire conversation from the realm of beautiful diplomacy to the plane of harsh reality.
In other words, Beirut is now expected not just to make statements about stability, but to provide concrete confirmation that it is the Lebanese state, not armed groups, that controls what is happening on its territory. For Israel, this is not an abstract topic of international law, but a matter of everyday security for northern settlements, Galilee, and the entire border zone.
What Israel gets under the terms of the truce
Israel retains the right to defend itself against attacks. This is a fundamental point because it means: even against the backdrop of a truce, Jerusalem is not completely tied up and is not obliged to wait for a direct strike if it sees an immediate threat.
At the same time, Israel undertakes not to conduct operations against targets in Lebanon. But here, too, the logic of the document is important. This is not a capitulation and not a renunciation of the military option forever. It is a restriction built into the regime of a temporary pause, which should test whether Lebanon can at least partially regain control over the south of the country and create basic conditions for further negotiations.
Israel and Lebanon also ask the United States to assist in continuing negotiations on all remaining issues. This shows that Washington is not just an observer but remains the main external moderator of the process. For the region, this is a typical scheme, but for Israel, something else is more important: without American mediation, such a track would hardly be possible under current conditions.
Why Netanyahu’s statement is more important than the text itself
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made it clear that Israel perceives the ceasefire not as the end of the conflict but as an opportunity to test a new security configuration. He stated that the IDF remains in southern Lebanon in an enhanced buffer zone ten kilometers deep — from the sea to Mount Dov and the Hermon foothills, up to the Syrian border.
This is a very important detail. It means that Israel does not consider the threat removed and is not ready to risk a repeat of the previous situation when Hezbollah operated on the Lebanese side of the border, and international deterrence mechanisms were weak or conditional.
What conditions Israel considers mandatory
Netanyahu directly stated that Israel sees the possibility of a historic peace agreement with Lebanon. But he immediately indicated that two basic conditions are necessary for this: the disarmament of Hezbollah and a sustainable peace agreement.
For the Israeli reader, there is nothing unexpected in this. As long as there is an armed Shiite structure at the border, oriented towards Iran and hostile to Israel, the conversation about full peace remains a political wish rather than a practical program. That is why the topic of Hezbollah’s disarmament again comes to the center of the entire discussion.
The problem, however, is that Hezbollah itself was not a participant in the agreement. And this is perhaps the most dangerous nuance of the entire construction. Israel fought with this group, not with the Lebanese state as such. But the group is not part of the deal, opposes negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, and considers such contacts a mistake and betrayal. Hence the main structural risk: there is an agreement, but there is essentially no full mechanism for its implementation.
Why the fate of the truce depends not only on Beirut
The Lebanese government has been trying for months to show that it is ready to limit Hezbollah’s military activity and Iranian influence in the country. Formally, the authorities have declared the military activities of the group itself and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which helped it, illegal. But there is a huge distance between a legal statement and real control.
In practice, Beirut still does not have enough power to truly impose its will on Hezbollah. This is the weak point of the new truce. Lebanese authorities can talk about sovereignty, but if they cannot disarm the group and restrain it independently, the entire architecture of the agreement remains fragile.
NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in this context draws attention to the central nerve of the whole story: today the issue is not in the formula “Israel — Lebanon,” but in the triangle “Lebanese state — Hezbollah — Iran.” Until this triangle is broken, any ceasefire will depend not only on diplomacy but also on how much Tehran is ready to temporarily restrain its regional tools.
How Hezbollah behaves
A representative of Hezbollah’s political wing, Ibrahim Moussawi, stated that the group would cautiously observe the ceasefire if it is a complete cessation of hostilities against it and if Israel does not use the pause for killings. This wording looks both like an attempt to leave room for maneuver and as a reminder that there is no final agreement within Lebanon.
With high probability, the pause itself became possible also because Hezbollah received a signal from Iran to observe the ceasefire at least at this stage. And here again, Tehran’s influence becomes visible. Iran and Hezbollah are already trying to present the truce as their own achievement, not as a result of pressure or weakness. This is important because the struggle for interpretation in the region almost always becomes a continuation of the struggle for power.
What this means for Israel right now
In the Israeli perception, the current ceasefire is not peace and not even guaranteed de-escalation. It is a limited window of opportunity. Israel retains freedom of action in matters of self-defense, maintains a buffer zone, and simultaneously tests whether the Lebanese leadership can at least slightly strengthen its own sovereignty without regard to Hezbollah and Iran.
Lebanese media not affiliated with Hezbollah are already calling the ceasefire a victory for President Joseph Aoun. But within the country, it will be difficult for him to maintain this line if Israel continues its presence in southern Lebanon and Hezbollah retains real military resources. This could affect both Beirut’s internal balance and the prospects for personal contacts between Israeli and Lebanese leadership.
An additional factor is Iran. Tehran clearly does not intend to abandon its influence in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East. It is no coincidence that the Iranian side tried to include Lebanon and other “resistance forces” in a broader ceasefire framework with the US. Israel, apparently, convinced Washington not to do this and to leave the Lebanese direction as a separate track. For Jerusalem, this is important: the less space for the Iranian umbrella over Lebanon, the higher the chance that Beirut will at least partially emerge from direct regional patronage.
In the end, the main thing that the Israeli reader needs to understand: the new ceasefire in Lebanon is a pause with very strict reservations, not the end of the threat. Israel agreed to stop the fire, but not to return to the old dangerous reality. And as long as Beirut does not have a clear answer on how exactly to disarm Hezbollah and limit Iranian influence, the conversation about “historic peace” will remain more of a hope than a fact.