Russia included Ukrainian Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, which it did not capture, in its “elections”: how Moscow consolidates occupation and why this concerns Israel

Israel voted against the Russian annexation of Ukraine, while Moscow continues to “formalize” the captured territories as part of its own state. In the State Duma elections in September 2026, Russia distributed deputy mandates across districts, including even Ukrainian cities not under its control.

The European Union and Ukraine responded with sanctions. For Israelis, this story has another dimension: Russian military cooperation with Iran and Moscow’s attempts to influence Israel’s information space.

Author: Alexander Khmelnitsky, NANews.

On November 16, 2026, deputies elected in districts created on internationally recognized Ukrainian territory are already working in the Russian State Duma. Among them is Sergey Makarov, whom the Russian Central Election Commission declared the winner in the Gorlovka district No. 15 of the Donetsk region. Moscow included Kramatorsk and Slavyansk in this district, although both cities remained (and remain) under Ukrainian control during the voting.

An unusual picture emerges: a Russian deputy receives a mandate from an electoral district that includes cities where Russian authority does not operate. This does not mean that the residents of Kramatorsk and Slavyansk voted for him. But in the documents of the Russian state, these cities are already included in the parliamentary system.

Why is this important for Israel? In October 2022, Israel, along with 142 other countries, supported a UN General Assembly resolution against Russia’s attempt to annex four Ukrainian regions. Four years later, Moscow is using ordinary state procedures to present these territories as part of Russia. At the same time, Russian authorities are developing military cooperation with Iran—a state against which Israel is conducting its own security struggle.

Russia included Ukrainian Kramatorsk and Slavyansk in its
Russia included Ukrainian Kramatorsk and Slavyansk in its “elections,” which it did not capture: how Moscow consolidates occupation and why this concerns Israel

These events are not parts of one proven plan. But they show different directions of activity of the Russian state system, where independent political control is limited, and internal decisions can have consequences far beyond the country’s borders.

Eleven Russian districts on Ukrainian territory

On May 23, 2025, Putin signed Federal Law No. 107-FZ, which approved a new scheme of single-member electoral districts for the election of State Duma deputies. According to the document, eleven such districts are provided for on internationally recognized Ukrainian territory.

Three are located in the Donetsk region, two in the Luhansk region, one each in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, three more in Crimea, and one in Sevastopol. Seven districts belong to the four regions whose illegal annexation Moscow announced in September 2022. The rest cover Crimea and Sevastopol, occupied by Russia in 2014.

The peculiarity of this scheme is that the boundaries of the districts reflect not only the actual control of the Russian army but also Moscow’s territorial claims. For example, in the appendix to the law, Kramatorsk and the Slavyansk municipal district are listed among the municipalities of the Gorlovka district No. 15.

In the Russian elections on September 18–20, 2026, the candidate of “United Russia,” Sergey Makarov, was declared the winner in this district. According to published summary results, he received 251,186 votes—62.38% of the ballots found in the boxes. The official turnout for single-member voting was 72.67%.

These figures come from the Russian electoral protocol and are not the result of independent international verification. They also do not indicate the participation of residents of Kramatorsk and Slavyansk, which are not controlled by Moscow, in the voting.

The fundamentally different thing is that Russian legislation extends its own parliamentary geography to territory that does not belong to Russia and is partially not even under its control.

Behind the formal scheme of districts, an entire administrative structure appears. Election commissions organize procedures, political parties nominate candidates, results are established, and deputy mandates are distributed. Within the Russian system, all this is presented as a familiar parliamentary process, although the initial territorial claim remains unrecognized by international law.

Thus, military control is complemented by administrative consolidation. For the Russian audience, the impression is created that the territories have already become an ordinary part of the state. For the external audience, there are official documents, elected deputies, voting results, and foreign experts who can be presented as confirmation of the normality of what is happening.

This is the political function of the electoral system: gradually translating a disputed territorial claim into the category of familiar state facts. But the familiarity of the procedure itself does not make it legal.

The elections are over, but the dispute over legality has only intensified

The elections to the State Duma took place on September 18–20, 2026. Already on September 21, the European Union officially stated that it does not recognize the holding of voting in the occupied territories of Ukraine and its results.

On September 26, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky enacted the decision of the National Security and Defense Council on sanctions against 44 people involved, according to Ukrainian authorities, in organizing illegal elections.

The official statement from the Ukrainian president’s administration mentioned, among others, Irina Kuksenkova, whom the Ukrainian side characterizes as a participant in Russian propaganda activities, and former Ukrainian deputy Yuriy Onishchuk, who began cooperating with the occupation authorities after the capture of Melitopol.

Kyiv stated that the voting was accompanied by coercion, falsifications, and artificial formation of turnout indicators. This is the position of the Ukrainian authorities regarding the 2026 campaign; it requires differentiation from earlier documented violations investigated by the UN.

On October 12, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictive measures against 77 people. The list included 74 candidates who participated in the Russian elections in the occupied Ukrainian territories and three members of the Russian Central Election Commission.

In this case, it is important to distinguish between candidates and elected deputies: the sanctions list includes participants in the campaign, not just the winners. The restrictions provide for asset freezes, entry bans to the European Union, and a ban on providing financial resources to the specified individuals.

Thus, while Russia formalizes deputy powers on Ukrainian territories, Ukraine and the EU consider participation in this process as a basis for sanctions. The difference between the internal Russian procedure and its international recognition has become not theoretical but quite practical.

A Russian passport and ballot do not mean voluntary consent

In discussions about elections in the occupied territories, the question often arises: if residents receive Russian passports, use services created by Russia, and participate in voting, does this not mean recognition of the new authority?

The answer requires considering the conditions in which these people live.

On March 20, 2024, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report on the situation in the occupied territories of Ukraine for the period from February 24, 2022, to December 31, 2023.

The document was prepared based on more than 2,300 interviews with victims, witnesses, and other sources. Russian authorities did not provide UN staff with direct access to the occupied territories, so researchers used available testimonies and materials, verifying the information received.

The UN documented arbitrary detentions, torture, violent suppression of peaceful protests, restrictions on movement, and access to independent sources of information. The occupation authorities changed the system of governance, education, and justice while simultaneously restricting manifestations of Ukrainian identity.

Obtaining Russian passports was of particular importance. People without such documents faced restrictions in employment, receiving medical care, and social benefits. For part of the population, a Russian passport became not a matter of conviction but a condition for everyday existence.

A person may process documents because they need to work, treat a child, or receive due benefits. They may comply with the rules of the occupation administration to avoid attracting the attention of security forces and not endanger their family. None of these actions automatically mean support for annexation.

The same principle applies to the assessment of voting. Formal participation in the procedure and free political expression are different things, especially in conditions where open dissent may be accompanied by the threat of persecution.

Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for genuine periodic elections that ensure the free expression of the will of the voters and the secrecy of the ballot.

The UN Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 25 explains that these guarantees are impossible without freedom of political discussions, independent media, the right to form associations, publicly criticize the government, and support the opposition.

For a resident of an occupied Ukrainian city, this means quite specific things. Can they openly advocate for the return of the Ukrainian administration? Create a political organization with such a program? Conduct campaigning, distribute materials, and participate in public discussions without fear of detention or pressure on relatives?

If such activity is dangerous, the mere presence of a ballot is not enough to speak of a free choice. The conditions of occupation documented by the UN explain why official voting figures cannot be mechanically transferred to the political beliefs of the population.

At the same time, the March 2024 report primarily describes events from 2022–2023. It cannot be issued as direct observation of the September 2026 elections. It allows understanding the formed environment of coercion; the assessment of specific violations in the subsequent campaign requires additional evidence.

Why Russian law does not change the status of Ukrainian territories

The international legal assessment of the Russian annexation was formulated long before the 2026 elections.

On October 12, 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution ES-11/4, dedicated to the territorial integrity of Ukraine. It was supported by 143 countries, including Israel. The resolution condemned the holding of illegal so-called referendums and the attempt to annex the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions.

The document confirmed that such actions have no legal force and cannot change the internationally recognized status of Ukrainian territories.

The meaning of this provision is important to explain separately. Occupation represents the actual exercise of power by a foreign state over foreign territory. But actual control, even if it lasts for years and is accompanied by the creation of state institutions, does not grant the occupying power sovereignty.

International humanitarian law regulates the obligations of the state controlling the territory. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 requires maintaining public order and, if there are no insurmountable obstacles, observing the existing local laws. Article 45 prohibits forcing residents of occupied territory to swear allegiance to a hostile power.

Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides for the preservation of the protection of the civilian population even in the event of a change in governance institutions or a declared annexation.

These norms have direct relevance to Russian electoral districts. The creation of a commission, the inclusion of a settlement in the voting scheme, obtaining a Russian passport, or electing a deputy do not eliminate the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and do not deprive residents of the protection of international law.

For Israel, the consequences of the Russian occupation have already arisen in its own legal practice. NANews previously reported how the Ukrainian company DTEK Krymenergo filed a lawsuit in a Jerusalem court demanding the arrest of Russian assets in connection with property lost after the capture of Crimea. The case touched on issues of enforcing an international arbitration decision and possible diplomatic consequences for Israel.

This is an independent legal dispute, not a direct precedent for the Duma elections. However, it shows that the international legal consequences of the Russian occupation are not limited to Ukraine and Russia.

Why elections cannot be assessed solely by official results

The problem of free political choice exists not only in the occupied territories.

The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Russia, Mariana Katzarova, in her 2025 report, described the application of legislation on “foreign agents,” “undesirable organizations,” “discrediting the army,” and spreading “fakes” to persecute opponents of the war, independent journalists, and civil activists.

Such restrictions affect the very possibility of publicly discussing state actions. If criticism of the war leads to criminal prosecution, the registration of candidates and the holding of voting do not yet mean the existence of full-fledged political competition.

On September 21, 2026, the European Union separately pointed out the restrictions of the Russian electoral campaign, including the non-admission of candidates from the Yabloko party on the federal list. In the EU statement, this party was named as one of the last remaining opposition forces with an anti-war program.

A significant contradiction arises: the state power presents election results as evidence of public support for its policy while simultaneously limiting the ability to openly oppose it.

That is why it is necessary to check not only the procedure for counting ballots but also the conditions of political competition before the voting day. If citizens cannot freely organize, discuss alternative programs, and criticize the actions of the leadership, the electoral results do not provide a full picture of the free will of society.

The issue also concerns Russian policy in the occupied territories. There, general Russian restrictions are supplemented by the conditions of military occupation described by international human rights structures.

OSCE was not invited, but an alternative association of experts was created

On August 6, 2026, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly published a joint statement: Russia did not send invitations to their observers for the upcoming State Duma elections.

For readers unfamiliar with this organization, it is necessary to explain: OSCE ODIHR is an international structure that deals, in particular, with the professional assessment of electoral processes. Observation missions check legislation, conditions for candidate participation, media activities, voting organization, and complaint handling.

The August 6 statement noted that the lack of an invitation contradicts the commitments made by OSCE participating states under the 1990 Copenhagen Document. The OSCE also recalled that it was unable to fully observe the Russian parliamentary elections in 2021 and did not receive an invitation for the 2024 presidential elections.

Thus, the 2026 elections became the third consecutive nationwide electoral campaign in Russia that the OSCE could not observe according to its established methodology.

The final part of the statement is especially important. ODIHR and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly again condemned Russia’s decision to hold voting in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and directly indicated that the results of such elections have no legal force from the point of view of international law.

At the same time, Moscow was developing its own international network of electoral experts.

On November 12, 2026, a member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, Areg Agasaryan, said in an interview about the creation of the International Association of Political and Electoral Expertise.

According to him, the history of the project is connected with the events of 2024. At that time, about 180 invited international experts opposed the position of the European Parliament regarding the Russian presidential elections and proposed creating alternative observation structures. Agasaryan claims that this initiative was later approved by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

In April 2026, the founding conference of the association was held in Moscow. According to Agasaryan, it was conducted with the support of the Russian Central Election Commission, the Public Chamber, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The organization included more than 80 people from 50 countries, and its representatives already participated in observing the State Duma elections.

Agasaryan also reported that during 2026, his structure, in cooperation with Russian state bodies, invited 283 electoral experts from almost 90 countries.

These are the statements of the participant and organizer of international work. They confirm the existence of the corresponding initiative and its connections with Russian institutions, but do not automatically consider each invited expert dependent or unscrupulous.

To assess the independence of observation, it is necessary to find out who invited the participants and paid for the trips, which sites they were allowed to visit, whether they could communicate with candidates and voters without accompaniment, record violations, and publish critical conclusions without coordination with the host side.

The status of the territory where the voting takes place is of particular importance. A foreign guest may see a working polling station and completed protocols. But these observations do not change internationally recognized borders and do not confirm the freedom of expression of residents who fear publicly opposing the occupation.

There is a fundamental difference between the presence of foreigners at elections, professional independent verification, and international legal recognition of the results. Mixing these concepts allows creating the impression of external approval where it is legally absent.

Israel has already defined its position on annexation. Why does the issue remain relevant?

On October 12, 2022, Israel voted for UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/4. This is an official diplomatic position recorded in the nominal voting protocol, not an interpretation by journalists.

For Israeli readers, it is important to understand that the resolution primarily concerns the principles of international law: the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the inadmissibility of acquiring territories by force, and the lack of legal force in the attempt to annex.

The September 2026 elections again raised the question of applying these principles. If the territory remains an internationally recognized part of Ukraine, deputies elected in districts created by Russia cannot change its status by the mere fact of receiving a mandate.

This is important for diplomatic contacts, international events, and coverage of the Russian political system. It is necessary to distinguish the fact of the existence of a deputy in the State Duma from recognizing their right to represent the territory of another state.

In recent years, Israel has repeatedly faced the need to publicly assess Russia’s actions. NANews previously compiled a chronology of statements by the Israeli Foreign Ministry on Russian strikes on Ukraine, showing how the formulations of the diplomatic department changed depending on the circumstances.

But there is also a more direct interest in Israeli security: military interaction between Moscow and Tehran.

On February 23, 2024, the US Department of the Treasury published materials on the Russian-Iranian drone production network. The American department described the participation of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics in financing and producing Iranian-designed drones at the Russian Alabuga site.

It was not just about the transfer of ready-made devices. The documents mentioned the supply of components, financial operations, intermediary structures, and the organization of industrial production of drones for use by the Russian army against Ukraine.

The Ukrainian war became a space for the practical application and improvement of these technologies. For Israel, this is significant, as the Shahed family drones and their modifications are used by Iran and are of interest to air defense systems.

On March 27, 2026, the Associated Press, citing American and European officials, reported on the alleged supply of improved Russian drones to Iran.

According to the agency’s interlocutors, it could be about variants of equipment refined by Russian industry based on the experience of the war against Ukraine. The Kremlin denied reports of supplies. The number of devices, the exact composition of the alleged batch, and its actual impact on the situation remained unclear.

This uncertainty is fundamental. It is impossible to automatically consider each alleged transfer of technology confirmed or attribute specific military consequences to it without additional data.

Russian-Iranian cooperation also affects logistics and financial routes. On November 14, NANews published a material on Russia’s assistance to Iran and the role of the Caspian Sea. Separately, the editorial team analyzed the creation of the American Task Force Iron Gate group, intended to counter illegal arms and technology supplies to Iran.

How is all this related to the elections in the occupied territories of Ukraine?

There is no direct causal relationship between Duma mandates and the transfer of drones. But the structure of the Russian political system is important for assessing the conditions under which foreign policy and military decisions are made.

When independent media, anti-war activists, and political opposition face persecution, society has fewer opportunities to publicly discuss military cooperation with other states, demand accountability, and influence government decisions.

This does not prove that a specific arms transfer occurred precisely because of the lack of public control. However, the restriction of political competition and independent oversight is a significant factor in analyzing the sustainability of Russian state policy, including Moscow’s relations with Tehran.

Russian information operations also affect Israel itself

There is another plot that allows seeing that the activities of Russian state and related structures are not limited to the territory of Ukraine.

On November 1, 2026, the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) published a study on foreign interference in Israeli public discourse.

The authors examined the activities of several foreign influence networks, including the Russian-linked Doppelgänger operation. According to the researchers and the materials used by the companies Alethea and ClearSky, the operation spread fabricated publications in Hebrew, including through a site that imitated a well-known Israeli news outlet.

In social networks, accounts were used that presented themselves as Israeli users. The publications touched on trust in Israel-US relations, possible deterioration of the economic situation, and other topics of Israeli political discourse.

INSS researchers did not establish that the operation changed the election results in Israel. They also noted the limited direct reach of the identified publications and the lack of confirmed coordination between all the foreign networks studied.

These reservations are necessary not to exaggerate the proven consequences of information activities.

There is no basis to assert that the Russian Doppelgänger operation, the holding of Duma elections in the occupied Ukrainian territories, and Moscow’s cooperation with Iran were elements of one controlled campaign. They are united by another analytical question: how Russian state and related structures operate beyond their own borders and how to verify official explanations of such activities.

For Israel, this relates simultaneously to diplomacy, security, and the quality of information received by citizens.

What Israeli journalists and experts need to check

After the Russian elections in September 2026, it is not enough to report that foreign observers visited the polling stations and were satisfied with the organization of the voting.

It is necessary to establish on whose behalf the invited expert is speaking, who financed his participation, which territories he visited, and whether he had the opportunity to communicate with people without the accompaniment of the host party. It should also be checked separately whether his conclusion presents Russian jurisdiction on occupied Ukrainian land as an internationally recognized fact.

For evaluating the results, it is also important to distinguish between official Russian data, independent testimonies, and statements from Ukrainian or international institutions. The Russian protocol confirms what figures the election commission announced, but it does not replace checks on the freedom of political competition and voting conditions.

Special attention should be paid to the population of the occupied territories. People forced to obtain documents, work in the changed management system, or comply with its administrative rules should not automatically be considered supporters of annexation. Their rights are preserved regardless of the decisions made by the occupying power.

Russia can enact its own laws, create districts, appoint commissions, and issue mandates from Ukrainian cities. It can invite foreign experts and publish protocols, presenting the voting as a regular parliamentary process.

But neither these procedures nor the participation of residents in voting under the control of the occupying power cancel their internationally recognized rights or turn territorial seizure into a democratic mandate.

For Israel, which supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity in October 2022, this issue did not disappear after the UN vote. It remains part of the assessment of Russia’s actions—a state whose decisions simultaneously affect Ukrainian borders, international law, and Middle Eastern security.