The question of Belarus potentially joining the war against Ukraine is once again returning to the international agenda. Minsk is showcasing military warehouses, Lukashenko is demonstratively speaking with generals, Russian propaganda is raising the topic of a new strike from the north, and Ukraine and its allies are closely monitoring any changes at the border.
The main question remains the same: is Belarus really ready to fight against Ukraine, is a repeat march on Kyiv possible in 2026, and who benefits from constantly keeping this threat in the information field.
For the Israeli audience, this topic is important not only as part of Russia’s war against Ukraine. It shows a broader mechanism of pressure: Moscow uses allies, proxy regimes, military threats, and nuclear hints just as Iran and its partners use tension around Israel.
Why the Kremlin is talking about Belarus and the northern front again
The topic of Belarus’s participation in the war against Ukraine has been discussed for more than a year. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia has regularly tried to create the impression that a strike from the north could begin at any moment.
Experts believe that such an information campaign is primarily beneficial to Moscow.
Firstly, it is pressure on Ukraine. Kyiv is forced to consider the northern direction, keep forces there, monitor troop movements, and not remove the risk of a repeat attack from the agenda.
Secondly, it is pressure on Lukashenko himself. Putin needs not only Belarusian territory as a military base but also deeper involvement of Minsk in the war. Lukashenko, meanwhile, has been maneuvering for many years: helping Russia, providing infrastructure, playing the ally, but avoiding direct involvement of his army in combat operations against Ukraine.
That is why noise is regularly created around Belarus. It does not always mean preparation for an immediate offensive, but Ukraine cannot completely ignore it either.
Why the northern direction remains sensitive
From a military point of view, opening the northern front would give Russia additional opportunities. It would force Ukraine to redistribute resources, complicate defense, and create a new threat to Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Volyn regions.
But the Kremlin’s desire does not necessarily mean the availability of resources.
A large-scale operation requires trained troops, equipment, logistics, ammunition, management, and Belarus’s political readiness for direct participation in the war. According to experts, there are currently no signs of such a full-fledged resource on Belarusian territory.
The Kremlin is betting on 2026 but faces a lack of forces
The Russian army continues attempts to activate hostilities on various sections of the front. Putin still strives to implement his concept of capturing four Ukrainian regions that Russia illegally included in its own constitution: Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.
The main focus remains on the Donetsk region.
The Luhansk region is almost completely occupied. In the Zaporizhzhia direction, Russia is also trying to increase pressure. In the Kherson region, the enemy has many more problems: there are not enough forces for a full-fledged advance, and the geography of the front complicates offensive actions.
Separately, Russia is trying to create so-called ‘buffer zones’ in the border areas of Ukraine. This concerns the Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv regions. Meanwhile, in Chernihiv, Moscow mainly limits itself to air strikes because a ground operation would require additional resources.
This is where the main limit of Russian strategy manifests: the Kremlin wants to expand the war but does not always have sufficient military potential for it.
What this means for Ukraine and Israel
Ukraine already lives under the constant threat of front expansion. Israel understands this logic well: when the enemy cannot quickly win in one direction, it tries to create pressure in several points at once — military, diplomatic, informational, and psychological.
In this context, NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers the Belarusian factor not as a separate episode but as part of a broader model of behavior of authoritarian regimes. Russia tries to exhaust Ukraine with the fear of a new front, just as Israel’s enemies often try to stretch the country’s attention between Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and international pressure.
For Kyiv, the main task is not to panic but also not to relax.
Ukrainian and partner intelligence continue to monitor the situation. So far, according to experts, no changes have occurred over the years of war that would indicate Belarus’s readiness to immediately join the war with a full-fledged army.
Repeat march on Kyiv, the Baltics, and nuclear threats: where is the real risk
Theoretically, Putin has not abandoned the idea of pressure on Kyiv. For the Kremlin, the Ukrainian capital has symbolic significance. In Russian logic, capturing Kyiv would break Ukrainian statehood and open the way to political control over the country.
But the reality of the war destroyed this plan back in 2022.
The Russian army could not take Kyiv in three days and in the following years could not capture any new regional center of Ukraine. Therefore, a repeat large-scale march on the capital would require much greater forces than those Russia currently possesses.
Experts also point to the losses of the Russian army. If the enemy spends more manpower on the front than it can regularly replenish, organizing new large-scale offensive operations becomes more difficult. People are only part of the problem. Equipment, weapons, ammunition, trained commanders, and working logistics are needed.
Belarus has another weakness — the lack of its own real combat experience.
Ukrainian and Russian military personnel have gained extensive experience in modern warfare. The Belarusian army does not have such experience. Yes, Russian instructors and former structures like ‘Wagner’ could train Belarusian military personnel, but this is not equivalent to full participation in a large war against a motivated and prepared Ukrainian army.
Why the threat may concern not only Ukraine
There is another scenario. If Putin cannot achieve a decisive result in Ukraine, he may try to shift the tension to NATO — not necessarily through a full-scale war, but through a hybrid crisis.
In this case, the Baltic countries or the Suwalki Corridor area may be at risk. Belarus in this scheme can be used as a territory of pressure, demonstrations, provocations, or limited actions.
This does not mean that such a scenario is inevitable. But it explains why the topic of Belarus regularly returns to the information field. Moscow can use it not only against Kyiv but also against European security as a whole.
A separate part of this campaign is statements about nuclear exercises in Belarus. Minsk talks about preparations with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, but experts consider such statements primarily an element of intimidation.
Belarus does not control its own nuclear weapons. Russia could place infrastructure there, modernize aircraft, transfer Iskander complexes, but the real decision on the use of nuclear weapons remains in Moscow’s hands. Even for the Kremlin, such a step carries enormous risks, including the reaction of China and other major players.
Therefore, nuclear hints in the Belarusian execution look more like psychological pressure than a sign of imminent use of nuclear weapons.
The main conclusion remains sober: the threat from Belarusian territory exists and must be under constant control. But turning it into daily panic is beneficial precisely to Russian propaganda.
It is important for Ukraine to keep its focus on the main front, strengthen defense, increase its own potential, and not allow Moscow to control the agenda through fear. For Israel, this plot is also understandable: when the enemy cannot win quickly, it starts to fight with nerves, expectations, and threats.