Donald Trump once again did something that was heard particularly painfully in Israel: he publicly praised Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, called him a strong leader, and essentially presented himself as the person who prevented Ankara from entering the war on the side of Israel’s opponents.
These words did not sound in a vacuum.
They appeared against the backdrop of the NATO summit in Ankara, taking place on July 7–8, 2026, in Turkey. According to NATO, the meeting of heads of state and government of alliance countries and key partners is being held in Ankara, and the summit’s symbolism is associated with the Beştepe presidential complex, where the main venue is organized. For Turkey, this is not just a diplomatic event but a demonstration of status: Ankara is hosting NATO leaders while simultaneously trying to regain access to American F-35 fighters.
For Israel, this story became a worrying signal.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had tried in advance to convince Washington not to return Turkey to the F-35 program and not to transfer technologies to Ankara that could change the military balance in the Middle East. But Trump in Ankara spoke a completely different language.
“He didn’t go because of me”: what exactly Trump said
At a meeting with Erdogan in Ankara, Trump stated that Turkey could have chosen “the other side” in the war but did not. According to him, Ankara knows Iran well and understands the problems associated with it.
“Turkey could have chosen the other side. They know Iran very well. And they know the problems associated with Iran. They could have entered the fight. You hear people talking about their relations with Israel. They could have entered the fight. This is a country with a very large military force. And they didn’t. Maybe they didn’t because of me. But they certainly could have joined the other side,” Trump said.
In another part of his speech, he turned to Erdogan personally.
“I like President Erdogan. He gave me a ceremonial reception. He’s amazing,” Trump said.
Then he directly linked the Turkish leader’s position with Israel and Netanyahu.
“I said he could have gone to war because he doesn’t really like Israel and doesn’t really like Bibi,” Trump said.
According to Trump, Erdogan “didn’t go” to war precisely because of him.
“He didn’t go because of me. He would have gone if it weren’t for me. He would have gone, and it would have been on the other side,” the US president stated.
This is an important formulation. Trump not only praised Erdogan. He publicly said that the Turkish president could potentially have ended up on the side opposite to Israel but was allegedly stopped by the personal influence of the US president.
In the Israeli context, such a phrase sounds like a warning: if Israel’s security depends not on a clear ally strategy but on Trump’s personal relations with Erdogan, then the room for error increases sharply.
June episode: Trump had already spoken about Erdogan and Iran
The current story did not begin on July 7.
As early as June 24, 2026, at the White House, Trump had already told journalists that Erdogan was “the main candidate” for entering the war with Iran, “possibly on Iran’s side,” because “he’s not a big fan of Israel.”
“I asked him to stay out. He stayed out,” Trump said then in the Oval Office.
At the same time, he added: “Erdogan is a great leader, a very strong man. Everything I ever asked him to do, he did.”
These words were said even before the NATO summit in Ankara, but it was in Ankara that they received continuation. Now Trump was already speaking next to the Turkish leader, against the backdrop of talks about lifting sanctions from Turkey and possibly returning Ankara to the F-35 program.
So this is not a solitary phrase.
This is a line.
Trump portrays Erdogan as a strong ally who can be held by personal agreements. Netanyahu, on the contrary, tries to portray Erdogan as a threat to Israel and the region.
What Netanyahu said and why he opposed F-35 for Turkey
On July 6, 2026, a day before the NATO summit in Ankara, Benjamin Netanyahu spoke on Fox News and publicly warned: Turkey should not receive F-35s or engines for its fighters.
The Israeli Prime Minister stated that the transfer of such systems to Turkey could “disrupt the balance of power in the Middle East.” According to him, this balance largely relies on Israeli air superiority and the American military position in the region.
Netanyahu used extremely harsh formulations. He said that Turkey is governed by a person who “openly calls for the destruction of Israel,” threatens Greece, talks about conquering Jerusalem, and Turkish officials allow themselves statements questioning the very existence of the Jewish state.
In the interview, Netanyahu also called Erdogan’s regime “infected with the Muslim Brotherhood” and reminded of Ankara’s support for Hamas.
This position of Israel is understandable.
The F-35 is not an ordinary aircraft. It is a technology that changes the quality of the air force of the country gaining access to the platform. If Turkey returns to the F-35 program, Israel gets not just a new competitor in the air but potentially a hostile regional force with American stealth technology.
Sanctions, S-400, and the question to the US Congress
The F-35 problem for Turkey did not arise yesterday.
In 2019, Turkey received Russian S-400 air defense systems. After that, Washington excluded Ankara from the F-35 program, and in 2020 imposed sanctions under the CAATSA law — Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
The American logic was simple: a country that possesses the Russian S-400 system cannot simultaneously receive the F-35 because it creates a risk for the aircraft’s secret technologies and could give Russia access to critically important data.
But on July 7, 2026, in Ankara, Trump said that the US would lift sanctions from Turkey.
“We are going to lift the sanctions,” he told journalists.
Answering a question about the possible sale of F-35s to Turkey, Trump said: “This is a decision we will make.” He also called the F-35 “a great plane” and “the best plane to date.”
Erdogan, for his part, expressed hope for a “favorable decision” on the F-35 and reminded that Turkey had previously been promised five planes.
American officials are also involved in the discussion. Trump said that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth are working on the issue. Earlier, Vice President J.D. Vance said that there are requirements of American law and the role of Congress in this matter.
It is Congress that can now become the main obstacle to the deal.
On July 8, 2026, American lawmakers began publicly arguing about Trump’s plans. Republican Mike Lawler stated that the sale of one of the most advanced American planes to Turkey “does not meet US interests,” risks compromising critical technologies, and sends the wrong signal to allies in Europe and the Middle East.
Democrat Brad Sherman called the possible lifting of sanctions “a deep mistake” and stated that Turkey’s return to the F-35 program would effectively mean handing over the “blueprints” of American technology to Vladimir Putin.
At the same time, not everyone in Washington is categorically against it. Senator Jeanne Shaheen said that if an acceptable way to solve the S-400 problem is found, Turkey’s return to the F-35 program could be a positive development for Ankara and Washington. Senator Mike Rounds also said that Turkey is a major contributor to NATO and could be important for deterring Russia in Europe.
So within the US, there is already a struggle not only for the planes but also for who determines American strategy: the White House, Congress, or Trump’s personal diplomacy.
Why this is important for Israel
For Israel, this story is dangerous not only because of the F-35.
Much more important is the political signal.
Trump publicly placed personal relations with Erdogan at the center of regional security discussions. He did not say that Turkey is reliable because its policy aligns with Israel’s interests. He said something else: Erdogan could have entered the war because “he doesn’t really like Israel” and “doesn’t really like Bibi,” but didn’t do so because of Trump.
This is a completely different level of risk.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency draws attention to this very point: Israel in such a scheme becomes not an independent strategic ally but part of a personal bargain between Washington, Ankara, and regional players. Today Trump says he held Erdogan back. Tomorrow the question will be what price the US is willing to pay to keep Turkey “on the right side.”
Turkey, meanwhile, has a strong negotiating position.
NATO emphasized back in 2024 that Turkey has the second-largest army in the alliance and spends more than 2% of GDP on defense. In 2026, the NATO summit is being held in Ankara. Turkey presents itself as an indispensable flank of the alliance, as a military power, as a mediator, and as a country without which it is difficult to solve issues of Ukraine, the Black Sea, Syria, Iran, and the eastern Mediterranean.
Trump acknowledges this role.
He directly said that Turkey is a “military power” with “millions of soldiers,” that it is “very strong” and has “a lot of our best equipment.”
Even if the words about “millions of soldiers” sound like political exaggeration, the meaning is clear: Trump sees Turkey as a heavyweight player that is more advantageous to keep close than to push away.
What is happening with Israeli influence in Washington
Israel is used to its arguments on regional security issues being perceived as a priority in Washington. But the episode with Turkey shows that this is no longer guaranteed.
Netanyahu warns about Hamas, Jerusalem, Greece, Cyprus, the “Muslim Brotherhood,” and the balance of power. Trump responds with praise for Erdogan, talks about the “red carpet,” about a strong leader, about lifting sanctions, and about Turkey being “more loyal” than some other countries.
This gap is where the main news lies.
It’s not just about planes.
It’s about Washington potentially starting to view Turkey not through the Israeli lens but through its own interests: NATO, Iran, Syria, the Black Sea, Russia, the defense industry, and Trump’s personal agreements.
For Israel, this means the need to revise its diplomatic strategy. It’s not enough to just say in Washington that Erdogan is dangerous. It is necessary to prove what specific consequences the region will face if Turkey returns to the F-35, retains the S-400, continues to support Hamas, and simultaneously becomes a “special partner” for the US within NATO.
Main conclusion
Trump’s words about Erdogan have become one of the most candid signals in recent months.
The US president essentially acknowledged: the Turkish leader does not like Israel, does not like Netanyahu, and could have ended up “on the other side” of the war. But instead of calling it a threat, Trump presented the situation as his own diplomatic victory.
For Israel, this is a troubling logic.
If Erdogan was indeed so close to entering the conflict, as Trump claims, then the question should be not “what a strong leader he is,” but “why was a NATO ally even considered as a potential side against Israel.”
If Turkey was not actually preparing to enter the war, then Trump is simply using the image of a dangerous Erdogan to justify a future deal: I held him back, so now we can talk about F-35s and sanctions.
In both cases, Israel has reason to worry.
Ankara received the NATO summit, the red carpet for Trump, talks about lifting sanctions, and a chance to return to the F-35 program.
Netanyahu received a public reminder that even Israel’s closest ally might consider Erdogan not a threat but a partner for a deal.
This is what makes the story around Ankara on July 7–8, 2026, much broader than a usual dispute about planes.
It’s a dispute about who today sets the rules of the game around Israel.