Putin once again talked about the “successes” of the Russian army, but this time the Kremlin’s arithmetic looked particularly confident — so confident that it stopped aligning not only with reality but also with geography. After statements about “captured” territories and almost complete control over Ukrainian regions, analysts from the Institute for the Study of War pointed out an important nuance: the facts on the map tell a completely different story.
This is not just about the usual Russian propaganda. Putin’s statements show that the Russian command likely continues to report to him not the real picture of the war, but a convenient version — with victories, percentages, and “daily advances.” In such a version, Russia has almost captured everything, almost defeated everyone, and almost reached the necessary lines.
The problem is only one: the front, satellite data, and geolocation are not obliged to adjust to the Kremlin’s mood.
What Putin declared and where the special regime arithmetic began
At a meeting with the heads of international news agencies in St. Petersburg, Putin claimed that Russian troops allegedly fully control the Luhansk region, more than 85% of the Donetsk region, and about 80% of the Zaporizhzhia region. Separately, he spoke about the advancement of the Russian army and repeated the usual thesis that the war is going “according to plan” for Moscow.
But the most expressive fragment was his phrase about the territory.
Putin claimed that Russian troops allegedly captured “two thousand four hundred forty thousand square kilometers” of Ukraine. If this formulation is taken literally, it amounts to about 2.44 million square kilometers — that is, roughly four times the entire territory of Ukraine, which is about 603.6 thousand square kilometers.
Even for Kremlin propaganda, this was a rare moment: usually, they just inflate percentages, but here, it seems, they defeated both Ukraine and the multiplication table at once.
What ISW showed
The Institute for the Study of War, in a fresh assessment dated June 5, 2026, indicated that Putin’s statements do not match the available evidence. According to ISW, as of this date, Russian troops have captured 99.77% of the Luhansk region, 79.93% of the Donetsk region, and 74.99% of the Zaporizhzhia region.
Even if considering not only fully controlled areas but also zones where Russian units have penetrated through offensives or infiltration, the numbers still do not reach the Kremlin’s version. In this expanded count, ISW speaks of Russian presence in 99.77% of the Luhansk region, 80.82% of the Donetsk region, and 75.7% of the Zaporizhzhia region.
The difference seems small only on paper. In war, every percent is cities, towns, roads, heights, logistics, and thousands of lives. Therefore, when Putin talks about “full” or almost full control, and the map shows otherwise, it is not about a technical error. This is already a political setup where reality interferes with the narrator.
Why the Kremlin is selling a victory that doesn’t exist again
ISW makes an important conclusion: the Russian military command likely continues to transmit distorted data about the situation on the front to Putin. This explains why his public statements look as if they were written not from an operational map but from a report by someone who really doesn’t want to upset the boss.
In 2026, the Russian offensive noticeably slowed down. According to analysts, Ukrainian forces in April and May liberated more territory than Russian troops managed to capture during the same period. This is an especially unpleasant detail for Moscow: the spring-summer offensive was supposed to demonstrate strength, but instead, it became another test of Russian logistics endurance.
Ukrainian counterattacks, medium-range strikes on the rear, pressure on warehouses, supply routes, and command elements complicated the Russian army’s ability to maintain a constant pace of attacks. The Kremlin can talk as much as it wants about “daily advances,” but if the advance turns into meters at the cost of battalions, this is no longer a strategy but an accounting of losses.
For the Israeli audience, there is an understandable parallel here. When an authoritarian system begins to believe its own briefings, it becomes dangerous not only for the victims of aggression but also for itself. Nikk.Agency — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers such statements not as a random slip but as a symptom: Moscow is trying to maintain the image of an advancing empire even when facts increasingly demand explanations from it.
Donetsk region and the “Fortress Belt”
A particularly sensitive issue is the Donetsk region.
Putin claims that the Russian army controls more than 85% of the region, but ISW assesses the confirmed control below this threshold. This is important because the Donetsk region remains one of the main targets of the Russian war.
ISW reports emphasize that given current trends, it is still unclear whether Russian troops will be able to capture the so-called “Fortress Belt” or the remaining part of the Donetsk region. For the Kremlin, this sounds almost indecent: four years of a big war, hundreds of thousands of losses, destroyed cities — and still “unclear.”
Russian propaganda loves to talk about “grinding” Ukraine. But if you look at the map, another question arises: how much more is Russia itself ready to grind its troops so that Putin can announce another percentage in front of the cameras.
What this means for Ukraine, Israel, and the war of attrition
Putin’s statements are important not only for the Ukrainian front. They show how the Kremlin is trying to manage the perception of the war at a time when the real pace of advancement no longer matches the previous rhetoric. Moscow is betting on a long war, on strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, on pressure along the entire front line, and on Western fatigue.
But there is a weak spot in such a strategy. To wage a long war, you need not only weapons and people but also an honest assessment of what is happening. If the top receives a polished picture from the command, decisions are made not based on reality but on political self-deception.
For Ukraine, this means that the Russian army remains extremely dangerous but not all-powerful. Its advance can be stopped, its logistics can be broken, its statements can be checked against the map. And this is exactly what is happening now.
For Israel, this story is also not foreign. The Russian war against Ukraine has long gone beyond the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. It involves Iran, drone supplies, military technologies, Moscow’s ties with anti-Western regimes, and an attempt to disrupt the international order on which the security of small and medium-sized states depends.
When Putin talks about “conquests,” and independent analysts show a different picture, it is not just a dispute about percentages.
It is a question of how ready the world is to check dictators with facts rather than listen to them as a source of weather.
The main nuance that the Kremlin does not like
Putin can boast about the army, missiles, defense industry, and “daily advances.” He can talk about full control where control is not full, and about percentages that do not match the map. He can even accidentally capture on words a territory four times the size of Ukraine — paper, as you know, endures, and the Russian airwaves even more so.
But war is not decided by statements.
If ISW data is correct, the Russian army in 2026 faced a slowdown in the offensive, Ukrainian tactical successes, and problems in maintaining attacks. This does not mean that the threat has disappeared. On the contrary, Russia remains an aggressor capable of killing, destroying, and exerting pressure by mass.
However, it means something else: the Kremlin’s legend of inevitable victory has cracked again.
And when a dictator has to explain so loudly that everything is going well, an attentive reader has a simple question: if everything is really so good, then why so much counting, rounding, and inventing?