In 2017, Russia announced the destruction of its chemical arsenal. This was followed by the poisonings of the Skripals and Navalny, and thousands of alleged chemical attacks were recorded on the Ukrainian front. A new Ukrainian report links a grenade with CS gas to Russian production and military supplies. What has been confirmed by international experts and why is this story important to Israel?
Author: Alexander Khmelnitsky | NAnews — News of Israel
Grenade, drone, and Russian military arsenal
On November 17, 2026, the OPCW distributed a Ukrainian report among the states parties to the Convention about the attack on September 20, 2024, near the village of Ilinka, Nikopol district, Dnipropetrovsk region. A drone dropped an RG-Vo grenade with CS substance on the “Zemlya” observation post with two Ukrainian servicemen.
The Ukrainian investigation examined the remnants of the grenade, video from Mavic 3, witness testimonies, satellite images, and military documents. The markings indicated the Research Institute of Applied Chemistry in Sergiev Posad and production in the second quarter of 2024. The supply documents mention military unit No. 42734 — the 115th Special Chemical Arsenal of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Investigators consider the attack a link in an organized system of production, procurement, supply, and application.
The OPCW independently confirmed the presence of CS in the samples and the compliance of evidence handling procedures with its standards; the responsibility of the Russian military and the supply chain was established by the Ukrainian investigation, not a separate OPCW mission to establish guilt.
According to Ukrainian records, 14,009 alleged chemical episodes have been registered since February 17, 2023. These are not 14,009 independent OPCW confirmations. The report is presented before the conference of the Convention participants on November 23–27, 2026.
Why tear gas becomes a chemical weapon
CS causes tearing, burning, coughing, and difficulty breathing. It can be used by law enforcement, but Article I of the Convention prohibits riot control agents as a method of warfare: the grenade forces soldiers out of cover under fire. Chloropicrin is a toxic substance known since World War I; “Novichok” is a nerve agent that disrupts nerve signal transmission. Their dangers vary, but the ban concerns the use of chemicals as weapons.
On September 27, 2017, the OPCW confirmed the destruction by Russia of 39,967 tons of declared stockpiles. Inspections verified the completion of this procedure but did not rule out future production, undeclared programs, or the use of dual-use substances.
From Dubrovka to Navalny: poisonings and investigations
Tbilisi, 1989: On April 9, Soviet troops dispersed a demonstration. Physicians for Human Rights investigated evidence of irritant use, including possible chloropicrin. This is an episode of the USSR, not modern Russia. During the Chechen wars of the 1990s, chemical accusations were also made, but several specific episodes were not independently confirmed.
Moscow, 2002: On October 26, during the release of hostages at Dubrovka, security forces used gas based on fentanyl derivatives; more than 120 people died. In 2011, the ECHR found violations of the right to life due to deficiencies in the rescue operation, medical assistance, and investigation, but did not recognize the decision to use gas as illegal.
Bulgaria, 2015: Arms dealer Emiliyan Gebrev, his son Hristo, and employee Valentin Tahchiev were poisoned. In January 2020, the prosecutor’s office charged three Russians; the suspects were linked to the GRU. The investigation found exposure to an unknown organophosphorus substance, but the use of “Novichok” was not proven.
Salisbury, 2018: On March 4, Sergei and Yulia Skripal were poisoned with “Novichok.” Later, local residents in Amesbury encountered the same substance; Dawn Sturgess died on July 8. British authorities pointed to the GRU. The final investigation on December 4, 2025 concluded that the operation was personally sanctioned by Putin. This is a conclusion of the British investigation, not an international verdict; Russia denied involvement.
Navalny, 2020–2026: On August 20, 2020, the politician lost consciousness in Siberia and was transported to Germany; in October, the OPCW confirmed biomarkers of a “Novichok” group nerve agent. Navalny died on February 16, 2024, in a Russian colony. On February 14, 2026, five countries — the UK, Germany, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands — reported the discovery of epibatidine, a potent toxin known from South American frogs, and blamed Russian authorities for the death. This is a different substance and a separate investigation. On July 3, the EU imposed sanctions on six individuals.
Syria and the promise to destroy chemical arsenals
Russia supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In March 2017, Syrian aviation used chemical munitions near Latamneh; on April 7, 2018, an attack occurred in Douma. In January 2023, the OPCW established that there were sufficient grounds to consider Syrian military personnel as the perpetrators of the Douma attack: cylinders with chlorine were dropped from a helicopter.
Russia disputed the findings on several attacks and criticized international investigations. However, the responsibility of the Syrian army does not prove that Russian planes themselves conducted chemical strikes. Claims against Moscow concerned support for Assad and obstacles to international accountability. The announced destruction of Russian stockpiles in September 2017 does not itself prove the preservation of the previous arsenal or the existence of a unified program linking various poisonings.
Ukraine: from initial accusations to the supply chain
After the Russian invasion in 2022, reports of toxic substances on the front came from servicemen and investigators. On May 1, 2024, the US stated that Russia used chloropicrin and riot control agents as weapons and imposed sanctions on Russian entities and companies.
On November 18, 2024, February 14, and June 26, 2025, the OPCW published three reports confirming CS in samples from the front, including materials from the attack near Ilinka. On July 4, 2025, Dutch and German intelligence reported evidence of large-scale use of chemical agents by Russian troops, including to drive fighters out of cover. Moscow denied the accusations.
The November 2026 report went beyond laboratory verification: investigators reconstructed a possible chain from manufacturer to front, analyzed the location of units, and rejected versions of Ukrainian origin of the grenade or staging.
On November 18, the European Union stated that the materials point to Russian troops, called for such actions to stop, and suggested the OPCW establish responsibility within its mandate; new sanctions are possible. Ukraine demands punishment for the guilty and opposes Russia’s return to the OPCW Executive Council. The report expands the evidence base but does not replace a judicial process.
Why this story is important to Israel
Syria borders Israel, so the fate of its chemical weapons and foreign military programs is directly linked to regional security. After the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, international specialists continued to investigate the fate of the remnants of the Syrian chemical program.
Israel signed the Convention on January 13, 1993, but has not ratified it and is not a state party to the OPCW. Ukraine, on the other hand, uses the procedures provided by the Convention. Its experience in documenting attacks during the war is important for protecting people and investigations in the Middle East.
Chemical weapons are not just a large stockpile of sarin: the use of a common irritant in combat can become prohibited. The Ukrainian report does not claim that Russia has restored the destroyed arsenal; it describes an alleged system of production and use of specific grenades. Further, it is necessary to establish those responsible — from supply to orders.
Years pass between laboratory findings and consequences: the final report on Salisbury came out seven years later, new findings on Navalny’s death — two years later. Now international institutions must decide what measures will follow the Ukrainian evidence. The destruction of declared stockpiles in 2017 did not guarantee the cessation of the use of toxic substances as weapons.