Can Ukraine face accusations of “war crimes” like Israel: strikes on energy, data centers, and international law

On October 29, 2026, international humanitarian law experts Marko Milanovic and Michael Schmitt published a study on Ukrainian and Russian strikes on data centers. Their conclusion was inconvenient for both sides: even if a state is waging a defensive war, not every facility serving the enemy’s economy becomes a “legitimate military target.”

Author: Lev Varshavsky

For Ukraine, this issue has become particularly relevant against the backdrop of strikes on Russian energy and digital infrastructure. For Israel, it is familiar from the war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, when the legality of certain army actions became the subject of international investigations.

But does this mean that Ukrainian military personnel face the same accusations as the Israeli leadership?

Can Ukraine face accusations of 'war crimes' like Israel: strikes on energy, data centers, and international law
Can Ukraine face accusations of “war crimes” like Israel: strikes on energy, data centers, and international law

When a civilian object becomes a military target

The rules determining the permissibility of strikes on civilian infrastructure are detailed in Additional Protocol I of June 8, 1977, to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, concerning the protection of victims of international armed conflicts.

Article 48 requires the parties to a conflict to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks are only permitted against military objectives.

Article 52, paragraph 2 establishes two mandatory conditions. The object must, by its nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively contribute to military action, and its destruction, capture, or neutralization in the existing circumstances must offer a definite military advantage.

A power plant, railway junction, or data center may simultaneously serve the civilian population and the military. Such objects are called dual-use objects. Their targeting is not automatically prohibited, but the economic significance of the enterprise or its ownership by the enemy does not in itself make it a legitimate military target.

Article 51, paragraph 5(b) prohibits attacks in which the expected civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

Article 57 obliges commanders to take all feasible precautions to verify the target and minimize civilian harm. Reasonably foreseeable indirect effects of the strike must also be considered.

For example, a substation powering a military command post may be a legitimate target. However, if its destruction simultaneously leaves hospitals without electricity, halts water supply, and heating in residential areas, these consequences must be considered in assessing the proportionality of the attack.

Ukraine and Russia are parties to Additional Protocol I. Israel has not ratified it, but the basic rules of distinction between military and civilian objects, proportionality, and precaution are binding on it as norms of customary international humanitarian law.

Why the controversy over Ukrainian strikes arose

In September and October 2026, reports emerged of attacks on Russian data centers of Yandex, Sberbank, and VK. The Ukrainian side linked some operations to the fight against the enemy’s information infrastructure.

Milanovic and Schmitt noted a significant circumstance: the dissemination of propaganda, the operation of internet bots, or the economic significance of a company do not in themselves make its servers a military target.

It is a different matter if the equipment provides military intelligence, unit management, or army communication.

The researchers did not declare specific Ukrainian strikes as “war crimes.” They emphasized that without closed intelligence information, a final assessment is impossible. However, public explanations of some operations, in their opinion, do not yet prove their compliance with international humanitarian law.

This distinction is crucial. The absence of open evidence of the legality of a strike is not equivalent to proven illegality.

What has already been established regarding Russia: decisions of the International Criminal Court and UN documents

International investigations into Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy have been ongoing since 2022. During this time, reports from UN investigators, arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court (ICC) for four Russian commanders, and findings of crimes against humanity have emerged. It is important to distinguish these documents: the UN commission establishes and qualifies violations based on the investigation results, while the ICC addresses the issue of individual criminal responsibility.

October 10, 2022 — the start of large-scale strikes on energy.

From this date, international investigators count the first systematic campaign of Russian missile attacks against Ukrainian power plants, substations, and distribution networks. The strikes continued throughout the winter of 2022–2023, affecting millions of residents.

March 16, 2023 — the first findings of the UN commission.

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine presented a report A/HRC/52/62 to the UN Human Rights Council.

The commission found numerous violations of international humanitarian law by Russian armed forces. Regarding energy infrastructure, its conclusion at the time was cautious: the systematic attacks that began on October 10, 2022, could represent crimes against humanity but required further investigation.

Thus, by spring 2023, the discussion was not only about the legality of individual strikes but also about a possible organized campaign against the civilian population.

March 5, 2024 — the first ICC warrants for energy infrastructure.

Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for two Russian commanders:

  • Sergei Kobylash, who led the long-range aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces;
  • Viktor Sokolov, who commanded the Black Sea Fleet.

The court found reasonable grounds to suspect them of responsibility for missile strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure from at least October 10, 2022, to March 9, 2023.

The alleged crimes were qualified under three provisions of the Rome Statute: Article 8(2)(b)(ii) — attacks on civilian objects, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) — causing excessive incidental damage to civilians and civilian objects, and Article 7(1)(k) — other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity.

June 24, 2024 — warrants for the arrest of Shoigu and Gerasimov.

The same ICC chamber issued arrest warrants for Sergei Shoigu, who held the position of Russian Defense Minister during the investigated attacks, and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. The decision was publicly announced on June 25.

The period of the alleged crimes is the same — from October 10, 2022, at least until March 9, 2023. The legal qualification also includes both categories of war crimes under Article 8 and inhumane acts under Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

According to the court’s position, some of the targeted objects were civilian in nature, and in assessing other strikes, there were grounds to suspect that the expected incidental damage to civilians was excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.

Therefore, the ICC considers two different violations: intentional attacks on civilian objects and disproportionate attacks, even if their target was a military object.

The warrants concern alleged individual responsibility for committing crimes, issuing relevant orders, or failing to exercise proper control over subordinates. They are not convictions.

June 29, 2026 — documented scale of attacks in the winter of 2025–2026.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report Attacks Against Ukraine’s Energy Infrastructure and Update on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 December 2025 – 31 May 2026.

According to UN observers, from October 2025 to March 2026, Russian armed forces carried out at least 423 strikes on energy production, transmission, and distribution facilities. Additionally, at least 74 strikes on thermal power plants and other heating facilities were recorded.

The damage led to prolonged power outages, disruptions in heating, water supply, and the operation of hospitals, schools, and other institutions. The consequences were particularly severe for the elderly, disabled, and families with children.

October 26, 2026 — conclusion on crimes against humanity.

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine presented a report A/81/440 to the Third Committee of the 81st session of the General Assembly, dated October 19, 2026.

This is the most significant change in the legal assessment of Russian attacks compared to the 2023 findings.

The commission concluded that Russian authorities committed war crimes in the form of intentional attacks on civilian objects, as well as crimes against humanity in the form of other inhumane acts.

The investigation covered the consequences of strikes from the fall of 2022, with particular attention to the winter of 2025–2026. The commission interviewed 255 people who experienced outages in nine regions of Ukraine and received information from doctors, government institutions, and non-governmental organizations.

At temperatures as low as minus 21 degrees, millions of residents were left without electricity, heating, water, and gas. Elderly people could not use elevators or descend to shelters, patients depended on unstable power supplies for medical equipment, and the closure of schools and lack of heating disrupted the daily lives of families with children.

Investigators found that the Russian command was aware of the vital necessity of heating for the population of large cities during the winter period.

The commission’s conclusion on intent is of particular importance: in its assessment, the strikes were carried out as part of a state policy aimed at depriving the civilian population of electricity and the vital services dependent on it, as well as causing suffering.

The commission’s established signs of intentional and systematic impact on the civilian population became the basis for qualifying the crimes as crimes against humanity. The mere fact of destroying a power plant does not automatically mean such a crime.

What has been established regarding Ukrainian strikes

In the report of June 29, 2026, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also mentioned a Ukrainian strike on a power plant in the Belgorod region of Russia. According to reports from Russian authorities cited in the document, it caused temporary power and heating outages.

The UN commission in its October report A/81/440 separately noted that it considered Ukrainian attacks on the energy infrastructure of Russia and the occupied territories of Ukraine.

However, it was unable to conduct a full investigation into the consequences of these strikes: Russian authorities did not provide access to the relevant territories and did not respond to the commission’s requests.

Therefore, the published findings do not contain a comparable legal qualification of Ukrainian attacks. This does not mean either recognition of their legality or the establishment of war crimes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

International humanitarian law requires assessing each strike based on specific circumstances: the military purpose of the object, the expected advantage, the foreseeable harm to the civilian population, and precautionary measures.

The fundamental difference lies in the evidence. Regarding Russian attacks on energy, there are already court decisions on issuing arrest warrants for specific officials and findings of systematic crimes by an international investigative commission. In the commission’s October report, there are no equally definitive conclusions regarding the Ukrainian strikes it considered.

At the same time, the UN commission’s conclusions cannot be equated with ICC convictions. The final criminal responsibility of specific individuals is established by the court.

Official documents: UN commission report A/HRC/52/62 (2023), ICC warrants of March 5, 2024, ICC warrants of June 24, 2024, UN report of June 29, 2026, report A/81/440, presented on October 26, 2026.

The Israeli experience: why the comparison has limits

After the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, Israel launched a military operation in the Gaza Strip. International disputes soon focused not only on the causes of the war but also on the methods of conducting it.

On November 21, 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Galant on suspicions of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Israel rejects the accusations and disputes the court’s jurisdiction. The warrants themselves do not imply a finding of guilt.

For the Israeli reader, it is important to distinguish the legal grounds of these cases. The accusations against the Israeli leadership are related, in particular, to the alleged “use of starvation as a method of warfare” and the treatment of the civilian population of Gaza. Ukrainian strikes on energy or data centers require a different factual assessment.

Moreover, Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute, while Ukraine joined it on January 1, 2025.

Thus, there is no automatic legal parallel. Only the general principle coincides: the right to defend oneself does not exempt a state from responsibility for the methods of warfare.

Does the seven-year reservation protect Ukrainian military personnel

On August 21, 2024, the Verkhovna Rada approved the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). President Volodymyr Zelensky signed the corresponding law on August 24. On October 25, Ukraine submitted the ratification documents to the UN Secretary-General, and on January 1, 2025, officially became a party to the Statute.

However, Kyiv simultaneously used a special transitional provision — Article 124, allowing for a temporary limitation of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

According to the official UN notification C.N.440.2024.TREATIES-XVIII.10 of October 25, 2024, Ukraine declared that for seven years after the Statute’s entry into force, it would not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes provided for in Article 8, if it is assumed that they were committed by its citizens.

If this declaration is recognized as legally valid, the limitation should be in effect from January 1, 2025, to December 31, 2031.

But from what specific accusations is Kyiv seeking to protect its military personnel?

Article 8: war crimes

Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines actions that may be qualified as war crimes. In relation to strikes on energy, transport, and digital infrastructure, three provisions are particularly important:

  • Article 8(2)(b)(i) — intentional attacks on the civilian population or individual civilians not directly participating in hostilities.
  • Article 8(2)(b)(ii) — intentional attacks on civilian objects that are not military objectives.
  • Article 8(2)(b)(iv) — intentionally launching an attack with the knowledge that the expected civilian losses or damage to civilian objects would be clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct overall military advantage.

For example, if a power plant indeed supports military command or arms production, its targeting is not necessarily a crime. But the command must consider the expected consequences for the civilian population.

Otherwise, the intentional destruction of an object solely to leave civilians without electricity and force them to pressure their own government is assessed differently.

Article 7: crimes against humanity

Ukraine’s seven-year declaration does not extend to Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which addresses crimes against humanity.

This article provides for responsibility for certain acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, with awareness of the connection of one’s actions to such an attack.

In particular, Article 7(1)(k) provides for responsibility for other inhumane acts of a similar character, intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to physical or mental health.

Article 7(2)(a) additionally establishes that an attack on a civilian population in this context involves the repeated commission of relevant acts in furtherance of or in support of a state or organizational policy.

Therefore, the destruction of a power plant itself is not yet a crime against humanity. It is necessary to prove the criminal actions provided for by the article, their connection to a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population, the corresponding policy, and the awareness of the alleged perpetrator.

It is by such criteria that international investigators analyze systematic Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy.

Article 124: why Ukraine’s reservation raises legal disputes

Article 124 itself is formulated more broadly than Ukraine’s declaration. It allows a state, upon joining the Statute, to refuse the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes allegedly committed by its citizens or on its territory for seven years.

Ukraine chose only the first option — crimes committed by its citizens.

This approach allows Kyiv to claim temporary protection for Ukrainian military personnel while maintaining the possibility of prosecuting Russian military personnel for crimes on Ukrainian territory.

However, the legality of such selective application of Article 124 is disputed. International lawyers note that the final interpretation of its effect falls within the competence of the ICC.

There is also an additional complexity. Even before ratification, Ukraine, through special declarations under Article 12(3), recognized the ICC’s jurisdiction over alleged international crimes on its territory starting from November 21, 2013. The relationship of this previously granted consent with the new seven-year declaration also raises legal questions.

On November 26, 2015, the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute adopted an amendment to exclude Article 124. However, as of November 2026, it has not yet entered into force, as it has not received the necessary number of ratifications.

Thus, the transitional provision continues to exist, but its application to Ukraine’s declaration is not indisputable.

The main limitation: even if Ukraine’s seven-year declaration is recognized as valid, it does not repeal the prohibitions of international humanitarian law, does not exclude responsibility under Article 7, and does not prevent the investigation of crimes by national courts within their competence.

The seven-year reservation is an attempt to temporarily limit the jurisdiction of a specific international court over a certain category of crimes, not permission for Ukrainian military personnel to violate the laws of war.

Documents: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles 7, 8, and 124; official UN notification of Ukraine’s ratification and the text of its declaration of October 25, 2024; status of the amendment to exclude Article 124.

Where is the boundary: when the very existence of the state is at stake

Ukraine and Israel find themselves in different wars, but they share a fundamentally common circumstance: both countries are essentially fighting for their own existence.

For Ukraine, the Russian invasion became a threat to independence, territorial integrity, and the very right of Ukrainians to determine the future of their state. For Israel, the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, the mass killing of civilians, and the taking of hostages once again raised the question of the Jewish state’s ability to ensure the safety of its citizens.

At the same time, the threat to Israel is not limited to Hamas. Iran has opposed the existence of Israel for decades, supports armed groups acting against it, and has itself launched missile and drone strikes on Israeli territory. The Lebanese Hezbollah, possessing a significant missile arsenal, has repeatedly shelled northern Israel. Yemeni Houthis have also launched missiles and drones towards Israeli cities while attacking international shipping in the Red Sea.

Thus, Israel faces not one adversary, but several interconnected threats emanating from different regions of the Middle East. Moreover, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis receive support from Iran, although they possess varying degrees of autonomy.

In these circumstances, the desire of both countries to destroy the military potential of the enemy, deprive it of the ability to continue attacks, and prevent new attacks has an understandable military and political logic.

But here arises an uncomfortable question: why should states subjected to aggression limit themselves by international laws that failed to protect them?

The UN Charter prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of states. However, this prohibition did not stop the Russian invasion of Ukraine. International law also did not prevent the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, the killing of civilians, and the taking of hostages. Nor did it prevent the missile attacks by Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis on Israeli territory.

When international security mechanisms are unable to prevent an attack, a state is forced to defend its citizens with its own army. And the demand to observe restrictions at the moment when the enemy attacks the population and threatens the security of the entire country naturally raises questions about the fairness of the international order.

Especially if the violator intends to use civilian infrastructure for military purposes and then presents retaliatory strikes as crimes against the civilian population.

However, international law has two different tasks. The first is to prevent aggression and protect the independence of states. The second is to limit the methods of warfare when it was not possible to prevent it.

Failure to fulfill the first task does not make the second meaningless.

If it is recognized that the threat to the existence of a state allows attacking any enemy targets, the very boundary between military and civilian targets will disappear. Then power plants, hospitals, and residential areas could be declared permissible targets whenever the warring party considers the situation sufficiently dangerous.

At the same time, international humanitarian law does not require Ukraine or Israel to abandon effective self-defense. It allows for the targeting of military objectives, including dual-use objects, if established conditions are met.

For Ukraine, this means the right to attack military logistics, command centers, enterprises, and infrastructure that actually support Russia’s military operations. For Israel, it means the right to conduct military operations against armed formations of Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other adversaries posing a threat to its citizens, as well as to defend against armed attacks by Iran in compliance with applicable norms of international law.

The boundary lies not between the necessity to fight and the obligation to observe the law, but between achieving a specific military result and intentionally causing suffering to civilians.

There is also the problem of selective application of international law. When the aggressor continues the war, and the state defending itself from attack finds itself under international legal pressure, a sense of injustice arises. It cannot simply be ignored.

But the investigation of possible violations by the defending state should not replace the assessment of the responsibility of those who started the war or committed the initial attack. Likewise, the legality of self-defense should not serve as a basis for ignoring the suffering of the civilian population on the other side.

For Ukraine and Israel, this is not an abstract legal dispute. It is about how to preserve the state, protect people, and prevent new attacks when international guarantees have already shown their limitations.

International law does not guarantee victory and does not provide automatic protection from the aggressor. But its rules allow distinguishing lawful military actions from crimes, and adherence to these rules matters both for international support and for the accountability of military command.

Therefore, the question is not whether Ukraine and Israel should defend themselves. They should and have the right to do so. The question is how to combine the military force necessary for the survival of the state with the obligation not to turn the civilian population of the enemy into an independent target of war.