The primary source is a special report by the State Comptroller of Israel, Matanyahu Engelman, titled “ההתמודדות הלאומית עם השפעה זרה במרחב הדיגיטלי” (“National Counteraction to Foreign Influence in the Digital Space”), published on July 7, 2026 in the official publication library of the Office of the State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel.
This document is important not only for intelligence agencies, lawyers, or cybersecurity specialists.
It is important for every Israeli who reads news on their phone, receives messages on WhatsApp, argues on Facebook, watches short videos, forwards “urgent warnings” to relatives, or sees an account on X that looks like an ordinary Israeli resident.
The report shows: the digital space has become a full-fledged front.
Iran is identified as a direct and specific source of threat through influence campaigns, false messages, attempts to incite panic, and affect the perception of war.
Russia in this article should be considered differently: not as a separate detailed case of the report, but as part of the same category of foreign state actors from which Israel must build protection. The main conclusion of the State Comptroller is precisely this: Israel has seen the threat of foreign influence in the digital space for almost nine years but has not created a national system capable of countering such operations as a class of threats.
Foreign influence is no longer just “fakes,” but a threat to the state.
The State Comptroller’s report does not talk about random mistakes on social networks or everyday rumors.
It is about covert and organized activities of foreign players who use digital platforms to harm Israel’s national interests.
This may include disinformation, fake accounts, bots, fake identities, manipulative campaigns, artificial promotion of topics, spreading panic, and increasingly active use of artificial intelligence.
The goal of such actions is not just to spread lies.
The goal is to influence public opinion, deepen internal divisions, reduce trust in state institutions, and affect democratic processes, especially during war, crisis, and elections.
For Israel, this is especially dangerous.
The country simultaneously lives in a state of war, debates about hostages, the army, responsibility for October 7, relations with the USA, political future, the 2026 elections, Ukraine, Russia, and Iran.
A foreign player does not need to create a split from scratch.
It is enough to take an existing pain and amplify it.
Fear turns into panic.
Political debate turns into hatred.
Distrust of a single official turns into distrust of the entire state.
War fatigue turns into demoralization.
And a foreign policy issue becomes a convenient tool for those who want to weaken Israel’s ties with allies and confuse society with foreign narratives.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency points out: the State Comptroller’s report is important precisely because it translates the topic of social networks from the category of “internet noise” to the category of national security.
Iran is named directly: SMS panic, “Hezbollah,” and the war for perception.
The Iranian direction in the report is revealed most specifically.
One of the most illustrative episodes is the mass sending of false SMS to Israelis.
In September 2024, about 5 million messages were sent to Israeli citizens. They urged people to immediately enter a protected space. Some messages looked as if they were sent on behalf of official structures, including the Home Front Command. Following an investigation by the National Cyber Directorate, it was stated that Iran and “Hezbollah” were behind the distribution.
This is not just disinformation.
This is a psychological attack.
A person receives an “urgent warning,” gets scared, wakes up the children, calls relatives, forwards the message further. Even if it turns out a few minutes later that the alarm is false, the effect has already been achieved: fear is spread, trust is undermined, society becomes even more tense.
This is what a modern influence attack looks like.
It may not physically destroy a house.
But it hits the nervous system of society.
The report also mentions campaigns related to the “Iron Swords” war. Already in the first days after October 7, an Iranian campaign was identified, trying to establish an accusatory narrative against Israel in the digital space, including the topic of “genocide in Gaza.”
This is an important detail.
The war is not only for territory and not only for military results.
The war is for the language with which the world describes events.
If an external player imposes words, emotions, and explanations of what is happening on society, they are already beginning to control the perception of reality.
The “Isnad” network: thousands of messages and hundreds of fake profiles.
One of the central cases of the report is the foreign influence network “Isnad”.
According to the data presented in the report materials, this network operated in 2024 and tried to influence Israeli public opinion by promoting the cessation of the war in Gaza on terms favorable to Hamas.
From December 2023 to August 2024, thousands of messages were prepared as part of this campaign.
Between 300 to 1000 fake profiles operated on X.
This is no longer one propagandist and not one Telegram channel.
This is a network.
It creates the artificial impression that a certain position is massively coming from within Israeli society itself.
One account writes.
Others pick it up.
Thirds argue.
Fourths spread it further.
Then real people, journalists, activists, families of hostages, politicians, and protest participants see it.
At some point, a foreign operation begins to look like “public sentiment.”
This is where the danger lies.
An Israeli thinks they are arguing with a neighbor.
But they may be arguing with part of a foreign campaign.
Where is Russia here?
To be factually accurate, it is important to say directly: the State Comptroller’s report does not build a separate large chapter on the Russian operation against Israel.
But that does not mean the Russian direction should be excluded.
On the contrary.
The main conclusion of the report is that Israel has not built protection against foreign influence as a phenomenon. It is not just about one enemy and not just about one campaign. It is about the ability of foreign states and external structures to use social networks, bots, fake identities, artificial intelligence, and digital platforms to pressure Israeli society.
Iran, Russia, and other external players fall into this framework.
Iran is shown in the report through specific cases: SMS, “Hezbollah,” campaigns around the war, “Isnad,” pressure on the perception of events.
Russia should be named as part of the same external threat because for Israel, the problem is not limited to one Iranian campaign. The state must have a system capable of responding to any foreign digital operation — Iranian, Russian, Islamist, or otherwise.
This is especially important for the Russian-speaking audience in Israel.
The Russian propaganda environment has been working for years with topics of Ukraine, the West, the USA, democracy, war, and trust in institutions. In Israel, these topics intersect with internal politics, security, and the issue of foreign alliances.
This is how Russia and Iran should stand side by side — not as equally detailed cases of the report, but as two external directions against which the state needs unified protection.
The state knew about the threat since 2017.
The most alarming part of the report is not the fake campaigns themselves.
They are expected.
Iran will try to pressure Israel.
Hamas will try to influence the war agenda.
“Hezbollah” will use citizens’ fear.
Russia and other external players will look for weak spots in Israeli society.
The most alarming is something else: the state knew about the threat for a long time but did not create a full-fledged response system.
According to the report, since 2017 various Israeli structures have already pointed to the threat of foreign influence in the digital space and the need for an interagency response. Among them are the Shin Bet, the National Security Council, the National Cyber Directorate, and other structures. However, initiatives that were supposed to turn into national policy were not brought to a working system.
By March 2026, almost nine years after the threat was identified, Israel still does not have:
- a unified national policy against foreign influence;
- a state body that conducts interagency work;
- an approved permanent mechanism;
- sufficient coordination between structures;
- a clear system of interaction with digital platforms;
- a clear channel for messages from civil society;
- full preparation of the population to recognize fakes, bots, and manipulations.
The State Comptroller essentially describes a recurring pattern: the threat is raised on the agenda, structures begin discussions, initiatives appear, but then the work does not turn into mandatory national policy.
For Israel, this sounds especially strange.
The country knows how to intercept missiles.
The country knows how to build cyber defense.
The country knows how to work in the most complex intelligence environment.
But in the sphere of foreign influence on social networks, the state system turned out to be fragmented and delayed.
There was an action plan, but it was not advanced.
After the start of the “Iron Swords” war, the National Cyber Directorate indicated that the Israeli audience is the target of influence and disinformation efforts.
In August 2024, the head of the Cyber Directorate presented the threat of foreign influence in the digital space to the Prime Minister.
In September 2024, an action program was submitted.
But, according to the report, this program was not considered for a long time. Only after the appeal of the State Comptroller’s office was it submitted for consideration by the National Security Council. At the same time, the necessary resources and practical implementation remained a problem.
That is, the state had a threat.
Had understanding.
Had a prepared program.
But did not turn it into a working mechanism.
And this happened not in a calm time, but after October 7, during the war, when digital influence operations became part of the overall picture of pressure on Israel.
The 2026 elections — the most sensitive point.
A separate block of the report concerns the elections.
Israel is approaching the 2026 elections in a state of severe internal tension.
Society is debating war, hostages, the responsibility of politicians and security forces, relations with allies, the judicial system, the economy, security, and the future of the country.
Such periods are most convenient for foreign influence campaigns.
The State Comptroller warns that the election period could become a “fertile ground” for attempts to influence the agenda, perception of reality, and decision-making. The potential damage could reach the point of undermining public trust in election results and the democratic process.
The Central Election Commission has identified several risk scenarios.
The first is a blow to public trust in the electoral system, for example, through reports of alleged fraud.
The second is creating chaos on election day, for example, through false publications that elections are canceled or a specific polling station is closed.
The third is deceiving voters through fake information about candidates, including deepfakes and reports that a candidate has allegedly withdrawn from the elections.
This is no longer fiction.
These are scenarios that state structures consider real.
That is why the issue of foreign influence before elections is not a technical topic.
It is a matter of sovereignty.
If a citizen stops trusting elections, the voting result, the commission, the vote count, and the democratic process itself, an external player has already achieved a strategic effect.
Even if not a single ballot was changed.
Artificial intelligence accelerates the threat.
The report separately warns about the role of artificial intelligence.
AI allows for the rapid creation of convincing texts, images, audio, video, and fake personalities.
It helps overcome language and cultural barriers, imitate real people, scale campaigns, and complicate the detection of foreign networks.
Previously, a foreign operation needed people, editors, translators, time, and money.
Now you can quickly create an “Israeli” with good Hebrew, a photo, a history, political views, and emotional posts.
You can make a fake video.
You can launch a fake news story.
You can imitate a local discussion.
You can create a sense of mass outrage.
And then social media algorithms themselves help spread conflict content because fear, hatred, scandal, and anxiety get more attention.
For Iran, this is an opportunity to attack Israelis not only with missiles and proxies but also through the phone.
For Russia and other foreign players, this is an opportunity to work with the Israeli agenda through distrust, polarization, foreign policy fears, and manipulations around Ukraine, the USA, Europe, and security.
There is no single responsible party — which means there is no full protection.
The report shows: in Israel, there is no single “owner” of this topic.
There is the Shin Bet.
There is the National Cyber Directorate.
There is the National Security Council.
There is the Ministry of Justice.
There is the Central Election Commission.
There is the Prime Minister’s Office.
There are structures that work with digital platforms.
But there is no single body that holds the whole picture, is responsible for strategy, coordinates departments, works with civil society, interacts with platforms, and has an approved budget.
The State Comptroller’s audit was conducted from July 2024 to January 2026 and covered, among other things, the National Security Council, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Shin Bet, the National Cyber Directorate, the Central Election Commission, and the cyber division of the prosecutor’s office. Some findings were classified for security reasons.
This is an important detail.
The problem is not in one weak department.
The problem is systemic.
The state sees the threat, but the response remains fragmented.
A citizen sees a suspicious account but does not always understand where to report it.
A public organization may identify a network, but there is no transparent channel through which the state systematically receives and processes such information.
Platforms remove some content, but the state does not always have a sufficient picture to assess the effectiveness of this work.
As a result, the Israeli is left alone with a digital influence operation.
He receives a message.
He sees a post.
He forwards an alarming “news”.
He argues with a fake account.
He gets angry, afraid, loses trust.
And the state system is still deciding who should be in charge.
What needs to change
The State Comptroller’s report essentially demands that Israel move from random reaction to a permanent system.
A unified national policy against foreign influence is needed.
A central body is needed to coordinate the fight against this threat.
An approved budget is needed.
Constant work with digital platforms is needed.
A channel is needed for reports from citizens, journalists, researchers, and civil society organizations.
More data on content removal requests needs to be published so that society understands the scale of the problem.
Educational work is needed — not only for adults but also for schoolchildren.
Because digital literacy today is not an additional skill.
It is part of civil security.
An Israeli must understand that a fake account can look like a real neighbor.
That a false SMS can be part of an enemy campaign.
That a video can be generated.
That “mass public opinion” is sometimes created by hundreds of artificial profiles.
That a foreign operation does not always speak a foreign language.
Sometimes it speaks good Hebrew.
Sometimes in Russian.
Sometimes in Arabic.
Sometimes in English.
Sometimes in exactly the language a person trusts the most.
Conclusion
The State Comptroller’s report shows: Israel is not facing a future threat, but an already active front.
On this front, Iran acts directly and aggressively — through influence campaigns, false SMS, “Hezbollah”, fake narratives, and attempts to sow panic.
Russia should be considered part of a broader category of foreign players against which Israel must build defense: states using digital space to pressure democratic societies, divide alliances, undermine trust, and promote a favorable worldview.
The main problem is not that Israel’s enemies are trying to influence Israelis.
This is expected.
The main problem is that Israel has known about the threat for almost nine years but still has not created a full-fledged protection system.
A missile is visible on the radar.
A fake account is more difficult.
But sometimes it is the first to launch panic, discord, and distrust.
And if the state does not learn to protect citizens in the digital space, the next attack may start not with a siren, but with a message that someone forwarded in a family WhatsApp.