In Moscow, at least three scenarios for the further development of the war against Ukraine are being considered, and only one of them allows for the freezing of the front line. This was stated against the backdrop of ongoing hostilities by the head of the Center for Countering Disinformation of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Andriy Kovalenko. The very framing of the question is important because it shows that the Kremlin is not thinking about genuine peace, but about various forms of continued pressure — military, political, and informational.
For the Israeli audience, this is not an abstract Eastern European discussion. If one of the Russian scenarios indeed involves a transition from the war against Ukraine to hybrid pressure on NATO countries closer to 2028, then it is already about a broader architecture of threats.
And when the aggressor simultaneously tests the front, propaganda, drones, sabotage groups, and the theme of ‘protecting Russians,’ it begins to resemble a familiar logic of gradual escalation, which in the Middle East they also know how to read without unnecessary illusions.
What three scenarios, according to Kovalenko, is the Kremlin considering
According to Andriy Kovalenko, the Kremlin is currently calculating at least three options for the development of the war. The first scenario is the continuation of hostilities against Ukraine at least until 2028. The bet in it is on the success of the spring-summer offensive campaign, but even in this model, as noted, it will be difficult for Russia to manage without additional mobilization.
This is an important detail.
It shows that even with all the military rhetoric, Moscow has structural limitations. A long war requires not only weapons and propaganda but also a constant replenishment of human resources. This means that the talk of war until 2028 is not just a fantasy of endless offensives, but a scenario that hinges on the internal resilience of Russia itself.
The second option is a gradual drift towards a ceasefire and freezing of the war. But even here, judging by the description, it is not about rethinking aggression, but about trying to formalize a pause in a form convenient for Moscow. That is why Russian propaganda, it is claimed, is already partially preparing the audience for such a turn, spreading theses that Putin is allegedly poorly informed about the real situation on the front, and the stalemate arose due to the generals’ lies.
Such an informational technique is well recognizable.
When a regime wants to save face, it often begins to shift responsibility down the vertical — to the entourage, the military, the executors, ‘incorrect reports.’ This allows not to completely deny the problem but also not to acknowledge one’s own strategic guilt.
Why the third scenario looks especially dangerous
The third scenario, voiced by Kovalenko, involves the continuation of the war against Ukraine with a subsequent transition to hybrid confrontation with NATO closer to 2028. Among the potential targets in this case are the Baltic countries, and the format of actions may include drone attacks and the penetration of small sabotage-reconnaissance groups.
It is here that the Ukrainian assessment goes far beyond the Ukrainian front itself.
If this scenario at least partially corresponds to real reflections in Moscow, then the Kremlin sees the war not as a separate campaign against Ukraine, but as a long arc of pressure on the entire eastern flank of Europe. And then the Ukrainian front becomes only the first and largest stage of a broader plan.
For Israel, this has a separate meaning. Israeli society knows too well that hybrid aggression rarely begins with a full-scale invasion. More often, it goes differently: first, informational agitation, then provocations, then limited strikes, then testing reactions, and only then — an attempt to move the crisis to a new phase.
How Russia may be preparing the ground for new escalation
According to Kovalenko, Russia is already preparing informational pretexts that in the future may be used as justification for expanding pressure. Among such topics are mentioned ‘military factories’ in NATO countries, as well as stories about the use of the airspace of the Baltic countries for attacks by Ukrainian drones.
This looks like typical narrative preparation.
First, an idea is thrown in, then it is repeatedly repeated through loyal platforms, then it is overgrown with details, and after that, it begins to be perceived as an allegedly natural reason for retaliatory actions. This is how a political smokescreen is built before the next round of aggression.
The topic of Narva draws particular attention. The mention of this Estonian city in such a context is not accidental: Moscow traditionally likes to look for zones where it can speculate on the theme of the Russian-speaking population, historical memory, and ‘protection of compatriots.’ It is through such plots that the Kremlin has tried for many years to legitimize interference in the affairs of neighboring states.
In addition, Russia is expanding formal powers for the use of the army abroad under the pretext of protecting those who are declared ‘persecuted Russians’ there. This is a dangerous legal-propagandistic link. First, an image of a threat is created, then a pseudo-legal basis is brought under it, and only after that does the opportunity for a ‘gray operation’ appear, which can be presented as forced.
NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency in this context may consider Kovalenko’s warning not as an emotional statement, but as an important signal: Russia continues to think in terms of a protracted war, where informational preparation and military pressure go hand in hand, and Ukraine remains only the central, but not necessarily the last direction of attack.
Is true peace possible in such logic
Against this backdrop, the question of peace sounds especially heavy. Formally, one of the scenarios indeed involves a ceasefire and freezing of the front. But in essence, even this option does not mean the Kremlin’s abandonment of the very idea of war as a tool of politics.
This is perhaps the main conclusion.
Moscow can change the pace, form, intensity, and public rhetoric. It can pretend to seek a pause, blame the generals, complain about circumstances, or test diplomatic formulas. But if scenarios of a protracted war and hybrid aggression against NATO are maintained in parallel, then talking about genuine peace is premature.
In such a picture, Ukraine remains not just a victim of the current invasion, but a barrier that prevents Russia from moving to the next stage of pressure. That is why the initial assessment contains the idea that only the Armed Forces of Ukraine now prevent the Kremlin from realizing broader plans.
Why this topic is important for Israel
For the Israeli reader, all this matters not only because of Ukraine as such. Here, the universal logic of a revisionist power is visible, which does not stop at one crisis but constantly seeks new opportunities to expand instability, test the weak points of opponents, and use pauses only to prepare the next step.
Israel knows too well the price of complacency.
When an aggressor begins to simultaneously work through the army, special services, sabotage groups, psychological pressure, and informational constructs, it is naive to hope that one tactical pause will automatically turn into strategic peace. Therefore, Ukrainian assessments of the three Kremlin scenarios are of interest to Israel not only as news from the European front but also as a textbook on how modern authoritarian regimes plan long-term confrontation.
Based on the described logic, the most realistic question today is not ‘does the Kremlin want peace,’ but ‘what form of war does it consider beneficial for itself at the next stage.’ And it is precisely the answer to this question that largely determines not only the future of Ukraine but also the level of risk for all of Europe in the coming years.