The close rapprochement between Russia and Iran has long ceased to be a historical curiosity or a situational partnership of two regimes under sanctions. Today, it is a much more dangerous construct in which Moscow and Tehran exchange technologies, military experience, political cover, and resources, and the consequences of this cooperation are increasingly impacting the interests of Israel, Ukraine, and the entire Western camp. This is the conclusion drawn from the conversation globes on April 9, 2026 with Arkady Mil-Man, former Israeli ambassador to Russia and head of the Russia program at INSS.
For the Israeli audience, this plot is especially important not only because of the Iranian nuclear threat. It converges several lines of tension: the war in Ukraine, the strengthening of the anti-Western coalition, the growing significance of drone warfare, and the gradual destruction of previous notions that agreements with the Kremlin can be reached through cautious balance.
How Russia and Iran turned from distrustful neighbors into strategic partners
From historical enmity to a pragmatic alliance
For a long time, relations between Russia and Iran were far from friendly. As far back as the 19th century, wars between the Russian Empire and Persia left a heavy mark on Iranian historical memory, and after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Soviet Union was perceived as an ideologically hostile force. Tehran’s Shiite revolutionary project and Soviet atheistic communism were poorly compatible, and Moscow’s support for Saddam Hussein in the war against Iran only intensified this hostility.
However, after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the situation changed. Russia was looking for money, markets, and new formats of external influence. Iran, in turn, needed technologies and political channels. Thus, a new logic of relations emerged, in which ideology gave way to pragmatism. One of the symbols of this period was cooperation in nuclear energy and the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Formally, it was about civilian nuclear power, but such projects always raise concerns because knowledge and infrastructure can become the foundation for military ambitions.
After 2022, the alliance became deeper and more dangerous
The decisive moment was Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. After February 2022, Moscow found itself under even stricter sanctions and began seeking support among states long living under international pressure. Thus, a de facto ‘axis of outcasts’ was formed, where each side has its own benefits, but the common enemy is the West.
If earlier Iran was largely dependent on Russia as a senior partner, now the relations have become more symmetrical. The Kremlin urgently needed Iranian drones, sanction evasion technologies, and survival experience in isolation. Tehran, in turn, gained access to Russian combat experience, new technical solutions, and, apparently, additional intelligence support.
This is where the topic goes far beyond bilateral relations. For Israel, this is no longer abstract geopolitics but a question of future threats on its own borders and in its own skies.
What Iran gets from Russia and why it should worry Israel
The circle is closed: Iranian technologies return from Russia already enhanced
One of the most alarming observations is that the military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran has become a two-way exchange. Initially, Iran supplied Russia with drones and helped deploy production capacities. Then Russia, having accumulated vast practical experience in the war in Ukraine, began to effectively return these tools to Iran in an improved form. According to Mil-Man, this may involve the supply of upgraded drones, as well as assistance in the intelligence field, including satellite data.
For Israel, this is particularly sensitive. Iran receives not just ‘hardware,’ but reprocessed combat experience from the largest modern war. This means that each subsequent attack from Iran or its proxies may be technologically more complex, precise, and dangerous.
Another indicative moment: after the first large-scale Iranian attack on Israel in April 2024, when elements of the Iranian air defense system were hit, it was Russia, according to the interlocutor, that helped restore these capabilities. Such a process makes the threat not temporary but reproducible. Israel inflicts damage, and Russian assistance reduces the time Tehran needs for recovery.
Why Moscow does not openly intervene but still plays against Israel
The Kremlin has not yet entered into a direct military alliance with Iran in the model of a full-fledged defense union. The reason, as the text suggests, is not so much goodwill as a lack of resources. Almost all Russian capabilities are absorbed by the war against Ukraine, and Russia’s oil and export infrastructure remains vulnerable. But the absence of open intervention should not create a false sense of security. Moscow is already helping enough to strengthen Iran’s potential without exposing itself to a direct strike.
This is the key mistake of many observers: they expect loud symbolic steps from Russia, while the real threat grows quietly — through satellite data, production chains, engineering solutions, training, and political coordination.
This is why it is so important for readers in Israel to perceive this process not as a set of disparate news but as a single strategic picture. NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has repeatedly pointed out that the war in Ukraine, pressure in the Middle East, and the strengthening of Iranian proxies are increasingly intertwined into a single security crisis, where events in Kharkiv, Tehran, and northern Israel can no longer be considered separately from each other.
What this means for Israel, Ukraine, and the West
Putin benefits from the US getting stuck in the Middle East
The text expressed an important idea: the ideal scenario for Putin is the deepest possible involvement of the US in the Iranian crisis. If Washington spends resources, attention, and political energy on the Middle East, Moscow will have more room to pressure Ukraine and further blackmail Europe. Against this backdrop, high oil prices become another bonus for the Kremlin, allowing it to partially offset economic problems.
This means that for Israel, the issue of the Russian-Iranian alliance cannot be reduced only to local security. There is a broader context here. The weakening of Ukraine benefits Iran. The entanglement of the US in the Middle East benefits Russia. The weakening of the Western coalition benefits both regimes.
Israel will have to reconsider the old model of caution towards Moscow
The interlocutor directly points out: Israel should do everything to prevent Russia from helping Iran, while simultaneously making it clear that the Jewish state has technological and military-industrial capabilities that can be sensitive for Russia itself. This idea sounds particularly sharp against the backdrop of many years of Israeli caution, where part of the elites believed that relations with Moscow should be maintained at any cost due to its potential ability to harm.
Today, such logic seems increasingly unreliable. If Russia has already integrated into the anti-Western axis along with Iran, China, and North Korea, then relying on restrained dialogue without revising the strategy may turn out to be not a protection but a form of self-complacency.
The fall of Ukraine will be bad news for Israel
One of the strongest lines of the text is the strong link between the fate of Ukraine and the future security of Israel. Arkady Mil-Man essentially says that the defeat of Ukraine will strengthen Russia as a partner of Iran and give the Kremlin new opportunities for expansionist policy. Conversely, the weakening of Russia will reduce its ability to fuel the Iranian threat.
For the Israeli audience, this is an uncomfortable but important conclusion. Supporting Ukraine is no longer just a matter of morality, diplomacy, or relations with the West. It is also a matter of Israel’s long-term national security.
The Moscow-Tehran alliance shows that old geographical distances no longer work. A drone assembled with an Iranian base and Russian refinement may become part of the threat against Israel. The Kremlin’s political game against Ukraine tomorrow may result in a new round of tension in the Middle East. And the sooner this is understood in Jerusalem, the more chances there are to build a strategy where events do not have to be caught up again.