The summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in Beijing looked like a grand stage for the conversation between the two leaders, but the real meaning of the meeting might not lie in the protocol, handshakes, or diplomatic phrases. The main action was happening in the mind of the Chinese leader: he is looking at Ukraine, the failure of the Russian army, and how the war has changed perceptions of the power of great powers.
Richard Haass, one of the most renowned American foreign policy experts, essentially speaks about the moment when Beijing received a live lesson in modern warfare. Russia, which China had long viewed as a strategic partner and military power, got stuck in Ukraine and suffered what Haass calls a catastrophic defeat. For Xi, this is not theory. It’s a warning.
Ukraine as a mirror for China
China has long been building the image of a power capable of acting tough, quickly, and without hesitation. But the problem is that the modern Chinese army has almost no real combat experience. The last major military conflict involving China dates back to the late 1970s, and among the current Chinese generals, there are none who commanded troops in a large modern war.
That is why Ukraine has become not just news for Beijing. It is a testing ground for others’ mistakes, which China is watching very closely.
Russia entered the war against Ukraine with the feeling that size, nuclear status, Soviet legacy, and a rigid power structure would guarantee results. But the war showed otherwise: a large army can be cumbersome, corruption destroys combat capability, and a smaller country can impose a new type of warfare on the enemy.
Drones changed the balance
A particularly painful lesson for Moscow was the Ukrainian development of drone warfare.
Ukraine managed to turn drones from an auxiliary tool into one of the key elements of defense and offensive operations. This is important not only for Europe but also for Asia.
If Xi is thinking about Taiwan, he cannot ignore the Ukrainian experience. Any operation against the island will be more complex than a land invasion. There will be sea, air, logistics, missiles, underwater risks, Taiwan’s allies, and technological defense.
And if Russia, having a land border with Ukraine, could not achieve its goals, then for China, the issue of Taiwan looks far less simple than it might seem on parade military maps.
Trump, Xi, and the danger of a grand bargain
The meeting in Beijing is also important because it takes place against the backdrop of several crises at once. Ukraine, Iran, Taiwan, trade, artificial intelligence, arms supplies, allies’ trust in the US — all these topics are more interconnected than they seem.
Richard Haass points out a worrying moment: Donald Trump often perceives foreign policy through a business logic. Deals, exports, quick results, personal chemistry with leaders are important to him. But international security does not always fit into the deal format.
Xi, on the other hand, acts differently.
Chinese political culture is built on control, scenarios, calibrated signals, and a long game. For Beijing, Trump’s unpredictability is not an advantage but a risk factor. China may try to understand where the American president’s red lines are and where there is room for pressure.
Iran as a distracting front
A separate risk is associated with Iran.
China buys Iranian oil, maintains relations with Tehran, and is interested in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open. But this does not mean that Beijing is ready to fulfill Washington’s wishes or pressure Iran as the US president would like.
Moreover, for China, there is another side to the situation. The more America gets bogged down in the Middle East, the fewer resources, attention, and ammunition remain for the Indo-Pacific region. This directly concerns Taiwan.
For Israel, this conclusion is especially important. When the US is simultaneously involved in the Ukrainian war, the Middle Eastern crisis, and Asian containment of China, each new conflict begins to affect the overall balance of American capabilities.
NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers such plots precisely in this connection: Ukraine, Israel, Iran, the US, and China no longer exist in separate information boxes. One front affects another, and weakness in one region is quickly read by opponents in another.
Taiwan — the main issue for Xi
For Xi Jinping, Taiwan is not just a diplomatic topic.
It is a matter of personal historical legacy. The predecessors of the Chinese leader left behind various symbols: civil war, the return of Hong Kong, China’s economic opening. For Xi, such a symbol could be an attempt to bring Taiwan back under Beijing’s control.
That is why in conversations with the US, China repeatedly returns to Taiwan. Beijing needs not beautiful statements but practical signals: will America continue arms supplies, will it pressure Taipei, is it ready to defend the island, and how capable is Washington of keeping its word to allies.
Haass speaks of strategic ambiguity — an old American policy where China should not be sure if the US will intervene, and Taiwan should not be sure it will be automatically saved. But today, this ambiguity has become more dangerous. Previously, it was a tool of deterrence, but now it may look like weakness.
If America does not come, allies will draw conclusions
Taiwan is important not only because of chips, although the production of advanced semiconductors is itself a matter of global economy. Taiwan is also part of the American alliance system in Asia. Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and other partners are looking not only at Taipei but also at Washington.
If the US cannot or does not want to defend Taiwan, the consequences will extend far beyond the island. Some countries will start seeking agreements with China, others — their own security guarantees, including possible nuclear deterrence. This is no longer a local crisis but a restructuring of the entire security architecture.
For Israel, there is a direct lesson here. Small and medium-sized states closely monitor how major allies fulfill their commitments. If trust in American protection weakens in Asia or Europe, it is inevitably discussed in the Middle East as well.
Russia is losing not only to Ukraine but also to its role
One of Haass’s harshest assessments concerns Russia.
He essentially says that Moscow has failed in its attempt to create a sphere of influence in Europe. Ukraine has become an example of how a state that was supposed to be an object of pressure turned into a center of resistance.
Russia retains nuclear weapons, but its conventional armed forces have shown weakness. It can export energy resources, threaten, destroy, blackmail, but no longer looks like a power capable of offering the world a sustainable model of development or security.
This is important for China. Beijing sees that a military adventure may not strengthen power but reveal its limits. Xi sees that even an authoritarian system with enormous resources can miscalculate, underestimate the enemy, and overestimate its own army.
Europe is no longer confident in the US
Another worrying conclusion concerns America’s allies. According to Haass, many Europeans are no longer sure that the US will automatically come to aid in the event of a new Russian strike on NATO countries, for example, Estonia. The very fact that such a question has to be asked already speaks to the depth of the trust crisis.
After decades of dependence on American guarantees, Europe is forced to rethink its security. But independence does not appear in one year. It requires industry, armies, political will, money, and society’s readiness to make tough decisions.
This gap between the old dependence on the US and new European independence can become the most dangerous. Such periods are loved by aggressive regimes: when old rules no longer work, and new ones have not yet formed.
Artificial intelligence and the new race of powers
In the conversation, Haass separately highlights artificial intelligence.
Here, according to him, the real “big two” truly exists: the US and China dominate in this area, while other countries lag significantly behind.
But their development models are different. China builds AI top-down, through the state, control, and strategic planning. The US develops it through companies, Silicon Valley, investments, and private initiative. Both models have advantages and risks.
Haass does not believe that America and China will be able to agree on full control over AI by analogy with nuclear weapons treaties. The reason is simple: technologies change too quickly, are applied too widely, and are too important for the economy, military, and domestic politics.
AI will become a political issue
In the coming years, according to Haass, the conversation about artificial intelligence will move from the expert environment to big politics. Society will debate data centers, energy, regulation, jobs, taxes, and the role of the state.
This also concerns Israel. The Israeli economy is closely linked to technology, cybersecurity, military developments, and startups. Therefore, the global race between the US and China in AI will affect not only Silicon Valley or Beijing but also the Israeli tech sector.
The question is no longer whether AI will appear in defense, diplomacy, intelligence, and the economy.
It is already there.
The question is who will control the rules, infrastructure, and political consequences.
The world moves like tectonic plates
The main thought of Haass’s conversation is not limited to one country or one summit.
He speaks of a world where old supports have weakened, and new ones have not yet become stable. America no longer looks like the unconditional architect of the international order. China is strengthening but fears mistakes. Russia has become a revisionist force but is bogged down in Ukraine. Iran continues to be a source of threat to Israel and the region.
In such a system, every event begins to sound louder. The war in Ukraine affects China’s calculations on Taiwan. The Iranian crisis affects American capabilities in Asia. Europe’s distrust of the US affects Russia’s behavior. The technological race affects military planning.
For the Israeli audience, this conversation is important not as a distant American discussion. Israel lives in a region where the weakness of allies, the strength of enemies, and the mistakes of great powers quickly turn into real threats. Therefore, the lesson of Ukraine is not only a Ukrainian story. It is a warning to everyone who thinks that the war will be short, victory guaranteed, and the neighbor weaker than it seems. Xi Jinping may be looking at Ukraine and drawing conclusions. The question is, which ones. One conclusion may deter China from an adventure against Taiwan. Another may push Beijing to seek a moment when America is too stretched, too tired, and too occupied with other wars.
That is why Russia’s defeat in Ukraine has become an event of global significance. It shows that a great power can make mistakes, that technologies break old calculations, and that a people defending their country can change the strategy of entire empires.