Ukraine has formally taken a step that at first glance should appear unequivocally strong and correct: President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law introducing criminal liability for manifestations of anti-Semitism. For the Israeli audience, the news itself sounds significant. Any state that specifically enshrines the protection of the Jewish community usually aims not only for an internal effect but also for an external signal — to Israel, Jewish organizations worldwide, and European partners. But in this case, the most important thing turned out to be not the fact of the signature itself, but the reaction of a person who has been observing this topic from within Ukrainian Jewish life for decades. That is why the interview with Yosif Zisels from April 17, 2026, deserves much more attentive reading than the dry news about the new law.
Iosif Samuilovich Zisels is a Ukrainian public figure and dissident of Jewish origin, an activist of the Ukrainian Jewish movement, the executive co-president of the Vaad of Ukraine, and the executive vice-president of the Congress of National Communities of Ukraine.
In his speech, Zisels did not play along with the solemn tone.
On the contrary, he essentially offered a harsh and sober analysis: the signed norm, in his assessment, looks more like a political and symbolic act than a truly effective protection tool. For Israel, this is especially important because in the Israeli perception, such topics are almost always considered through practical results. Not just whether the law was adopted, but whether it will work, who it will actually protect, how judicial practice will change, and whether the beautiful wording will turn into an empty declaration.
Why the news itself sounds loud, but substantively raises questions
At the headline level, everything looks simple: Ukraine has introduced separate criminal liability for manifestations of anti-Semitism.
For an outside observer, this may look like a sign of the state’s maturity, especially against the backdrop of war, constant international attention, and complex discussions about memory, identity, and minority rights. But Zisels in the interview immediately shifts the focus: the problem, he says, is not how the law sounds, but how legally viable it is.
He reminds us that this is not about a fundamentally new protection system, but about supplementing an already existing article of the Criminal Code, which previously dealt with inciting national, racial, and religious hatred. Now the text has separately added words about manifestations of anti-Semitism. Formally, this makes the protection of the Jewish community more explicit. But this is where the main doubt begins: if the basic article has hardly worked as an effective mechanism for decades, why should one new clarification suddenly change reality.
Zisels speaks about this very directly. In his opinion, the norm remains weak, legally unconvincing, and poorly adapted to real application. Moreover, he emphasizes that the article itself in its current form has long raised questions, and broader changes to the Criminal Code are already being discussed in Ukraine, under which the existing structure may be significantly revised. In other words, the state is signing something that may be rewritten anew in the foreseeable future.
For the Israeli reader, this immediately evokes an understandable association: if the system is preparing for revision, then the current gesture is largely aimed at an immediate political effect.
Why Zisels does not consider Ukraine an anti-Semitic country
This is perhaps the most important and at the same time the most inconvenient thesis for loud headlines in the entire interview.
Yosif Zisels essentially destroys the logic in which the adoption of such a law is automatically interpreted as a response to some acute wave of anti-Semitism. He says the opposite: in his assessment, Ukraine today is not an anti-Semitic country, and the level of anti-Semitic manifestations there is minimal by European standards.
For Israel, this thesis has special value. In the Israeli public sphere, the topic of anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe almost always becomes entangled with emotional and historical layers. But if one of the most famous representatives of the Jewish public life of Ukraine claims that today’s Ukraine does not bear the reputation of an anti-Semitic state, this cannot be ignored. Especially since he supports his position not only with a personal assessment but also with references to long-term sociological studies, according to which Jews in Ukraine are in a comparatively favorable zone of public perception.
This does not mean that the problem does not exist at all. It means something else: there is a noticeable gap between the real picture and the political framing of the topic. If the level of threat is low, and the law is presented as an almost historical step, a natural question arises — to whom is this signal addressed. To Ukrainian society, where the problem does not seem dominant? To Europe? To Israel? Or to everyone at once?
The Israeli perspective: is this a step towards the Jewish world or a political gesture
For the Israeli audience, the topic is interesting not only from a legal point of view. Here, the context of relations between Ukraine, Israel, and global Jewish structures is important.
In the interview, Zisels rather coldly assesses this possible effect as well. He directly says that the signing of the law is unlikely to significantly change Ukraine’s international image and will not become a turning point in its dialogue with Israel or global Jewish organizations.
This sounds harsh but logical. Israel, like most serious Jewish institutions, is accustomed to evaluating not gestures but sustainable trends. If in Ukraine anti-Semitism has long not been perceived as a systemic state line, then a separate clarification in the criminal article will not cause a revolution. It may be noted, perhaps even positively, but it will not become a factor that radically changes the attitude towards the country.
It is at this point that a broader political meaning arises. For Kyiv, it is extremely important now to demonstrate to the Western world and especially to Europe that Ukraine is moving towards a legal, inclusive, European state. Such a demonstration is understandable. But Zisels warns: the problem is that the imitation of movement towards Europe and the real approach to European standards are not the same. Signing a law is easy. Ensuring its competent formulation, transparent application, and trust in institutions is much more difficult.
In this sense, the story with the new law becomes part of a larger plot that the Israeli audience understands well. The Middle East has long taught Israel that political symbolism can be loud, but it is precisely law enforcement that shows what the system is really worth. When a state declares a fight against hatred, the main question is always one: will it work equally for everyone or remain a showcase norm.
Why the rush and authorship of the law also matter
The interview also raises the topic of the origin of the bill itself. Zisels reminds us that the document is not new: the Verkhovna Rada adopted it back in February 2022, and it was only signed now. This alone makes the story strange. If the norm was so important and fundamental, why did it lie unsigned for several years? If there was no decisive necessity, then why was it suddenly pulled out and formalized as a current step now.
Zisels himself puts forward several possible explanations: the calendar moment, Passover, the president’s contacts with religious representatives, the general external background. But the main thing is different. He does not perceive this as the result of a deeply thought-out reform. Rather, as a hasty and largely populist step that is convenient to present in external communication.
Here another sensitive element appears — the figure of the author of the bill, deputy Maksym Buzhansky. In the interview, this name is mentioned in a clearly negative context. For the Israeli reader, this is important not so much because of the personality itself, but because of the principle: trust in a legislative initiative depends not only on the text but also on the political reputation of those who promote it.
If a law on such a delicate topic is associated with a figure perceived controversially in Ukrainian society, this automatically reduces trust in the motives of the entire story.
And here NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency sees one of the key nodes of the entire topic: a law to combat anti-Semitism may be a morally correct idea, but in a politically overloaded environment, even the right idea easily turns into a tool of PR, demonstration of loyalty to the West, or an internal political maneuver. For the Jewish audience of Israel, this is not an abstraction, but an understandable and familiar logic: the words of the authorities always need to be checked by how exactly and against whom they are then applied.
What really matters for the Jewish community and for Israel’s relations with Ukraine
If you remove the political noise, the most essential question remains: what really makes the life of the Jewish community safer. And here Zisels’ interview provides an answer that looks almost anticlimactic for supporters of loud news. Essentially, he says that the key is not in new words in the code, but in the functioning rule of law, institutional trust, and the state’s ability to apply norms consistently, not selectively.
This is especially important against the backdrop of war. Ukraine lives under colossal pressure, and a significant part of the state and public resource is objectively directed towards resisting Russia.
In such conditions, any additional legislative initiatives can either become part of real legal modernization or dissolve in political noise. Zisels is more inclined towards the latter option. He even admits that such vague norms may be used not only for their intended purpose but also as a tool of pressure on opponents. For any democracy, this is a worrying signal.
From an Israeli point of view, there is also a deeper conclusion here. The real value of Ukraine for the Jewish world today is determined not by how many times anti-Semitism is separately mentioned in its laws, but by whether the country remains a space where Jewish life is perceived as a normal part of society, where the memory of Jewish history is not displaced, and where Jewish organizations can work freely. It is this, not the symbolic gesture itself, that forms the long-term relationship.
What this means for the Israeli reader right now
The Israeli audience should not perceive this news in a black-and-white optic.
This is not a story about Ukraine suddenly becoming an exemplary state in matters of combating anti-Semitism. But it is also not a story about something alarmingly anti-Semitic happening that requires an urgent reaction. Rather, it is an example of how at the intersection of war, politics, international image, and the topic of historical sensitivity, a decision emerges that looks beautiful in the official agenda but raises questions among experienced representatives of the Jewish community of Ukraine itself.
For Israel, there is a useful lesson in this. In relations with Ukraine, it is important to maintain two optics at once. The first is respect for the reality in which Ukraine does not appear today as a country with a pronounced anti-Semitic atmosphere, at least not in the way Russian propaganda often portrays it. The second is caution towards overly convenient political gestures that want to quickly convert into moral capital on the international stage.
That is why Yosif Zisels’ interview is interesting not as a commentary on one narrow legal amendment.
It is interesting as a test of the maturity of the conversation about the Jewish topic in Ukraine. Not through slogans, not through pathos, not through automatic praise of the authorities, but through an unpleasant but necessary question: the law was adopted — but what will really change after this tomorrow, in a month, and in a year. In Israeli political culture, this question has always been the main one. And it remains here without a definitive answer.